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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Social Influences on Children’s Option Valuations  
by 
Laura Pape Hennefield 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015 
Professor Lori Markson, Chair 
Children use a variety of strategies to determine the relative value of the objects they encounter, 
ranging from simple heuristics to the integration of information from multiple sources. Do 
children also incorporate social information – specifically, information pertaining to others’ 
preferences – into their object valuations? Valuation is an important component of economic 
exchange, and is key to assessing how resources are fairly distributed or favors reciprocated. As 
humans often need to make critical decisions with limited information, garnering information 
about value via social sources might be an adaptive strategy. This dissertation has two primary 
goals: (1) to develop methodology to assess value discrimination in young children, and (2) to 
investigate how young children’s resource valuations – and subsequent preferences – might be 
influenced by the preferences of their peers. These goals were realized across four empirical 
studies. The study presented in Chapter 2 used an established resource distribution methodology, 
the Dictator Game, to test whether 4-year-old children’s preferences were influenced by the 
preferences of their peers. Children observed, via video, four peers sequentially display the same 
preference for one of two stickers. Each peer expressed liking one sticker and disliking the other. 
Subsequently, in the Dictator Game, children kept more stickers their peers liked than stickers 
their peers disliked, suggesting that children extracted informational content about the value of 
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the resources from their peers and used that to guide their own preferences. The studies presented 
in Chapter 3 aimed to clarify these findings, extend this research to younger children, and 
develop new resource distribution tasks to assess value discrimination. Three studies investigated 
whether 3-year-old children differentially distribute two resources (stickers) based on an a priori 
preference for one of the resources (Study 1), use peers’ preferences (e.g., their likes and 
dislikes) to inform their valuations and subsequent resource distribution when children do not 
have an a priori preference for a resource (Study 2), and incorporate peers’ preferences into their 
own choices (Study 3). The results suggest that young children used their a priori, explicitly 
stated, preferences to differentially distribute the resources, giving their favorite option to a 
prosocial agent who was presumably more deserving than the other agent. Further, after viewing 
four peers express a consistent preference for one option over another, children appeared to 
devalue the option their peers disliked, as they systematically avoided selecting it for a prosocial 
agent, a new child, and themselves. Interestingly, in the resource distribution tasks, girls, but not 
boys, appeared to increase their value of the option their peers liked, as they gave more liked 
than neutral (non-valenced) resources to the prosocial agents. Finally, children chose equally 
between the liked and neutral resources as their own favorite, while avoiding the disliked 
resources. These findings suggest that children’s resource valuations are informed by the 
preferences of their peers. Further, it is possible that subjective negative information (e.g., 
others’ dislikes) plays a privileged role in influencing children’s choice behavior. These findings 
are discussed in the context of a negativity bias, and several explanations are considered to 
explain the gender difference. Together, the studies provide new insight into children’s early 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Children use a variety of strategies to determine the relative value of options they 
encounter, ranging from simple heuristics to the integration of information from multiple 
sources. Do children also incorporate social information – specifically, information acquired via 
observing others’ preferences – into their option valuations? Valuation is an important 
component of economic exchange, and is key to assessing how resources are fairly distributed or 
favors reciprocated. That even young children appear to have some understanding of both 
fairness (e.g., LoBue, Nishida, Chiong, DeLoache, & Haidt, 2009; Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; 
Geraci & Surian, 2011; Baumard, Mascaro, & Chevallier, 2012; Sloane, Baillargeon, & 
Premack, 2012; Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun, & Burns, 2013) and reciprocity (e.g., Lucas, 
Wagner, & Chow, 2008; Olson & Spelke, 2008; Engelmann, Over, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 
2013; House, Henrich, Sarnecka, & Silk, 2013; Warneken & Tomasello, 2013) suggests that an 
ability to assign value to options is present from a young age. Further, as humans often need to 
make critical decisions with limited information, garnering information about value via social 
sources might be an adaptive strategy. Previous studies indicate that young children are highly 
motivated to attend to and learn from the actions of others. Whether this includes learning about 
the value of options via observing others’ preferences remains unknown. 
Value, for the present purpose, is defined as the relative importance, usefulness, or worth 
of an option (e.g., a good or service). Value discrimination is a comparison of two or more 
options that vary on multiple dimensions; economic choice is the decision that results from such 
comparison. Thus, values, as such, are computed at the time a choice is made, based on multiple 
dimensions, including attributes of the option, quantity, temporal availability, and current 




develop methodology to assess value discrimination in young children, and (2) to investigate 
whether one particular type of social information – other children’s preferences – factors into the 
relative subjective value that children assign to options.  
This work focused on the preferences of other children for two reasons. First, there is 
substantial evidence that children are not indiscriminate learners – they consider factors such as 
past reliability (e.g., Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig & Harris, 
2005), expertise (Keil, Stein, Webb, Billings, & Rozenblit, 2008), consensus with a majority 
(Corriveau, Fusaro, & Harris, 2009), and even group membership (Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 
2010), in determining from whom to learn. Further, children are also able to consider the content 
of the material, for example, whether they need information about toys or food, when 
determining whether a child or an adult is a better source of information (VanderBorght & 
Jaswal, 2009). Thus, children might selectively learn from the preferences, and in particular the 
object preferences, of their peers over those of an adult.  
Second, peers are critical to the fabric of young children’s social environment. Preschool 
children form complex social networks, which include strong reciprocal friendships with a 
limited number of peers, relationships with friends of friends, and hierarchies of popularity 
(Schaefer, Light, Fabes, Hanish, & Martin, 2010). There is also emerging evidence that children 
engage in behaviors that strengthen social connections and group membership, such as 
conformity (Haun & Tomasello, 2011) and reputation management (Engelmann, Herrmann, & 
Tomasello, 2012; Leimgruber, Shaw, Santos, & Olson, 2012; Engelmann et al., 2013). Research 
on children’s learning in social contexts has primarily focused on factual information that 
children learn from adults (e.g., Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). However, as peers comprise an 




information that children might learn from peers is crucial to a comprehensive understanding of 
social cognitive development. The present research aims to address this gap and provide insight 
into one context – preferences – in which children might learn from their peers.    
 This dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 provides a general introduction 
and discusses several pertinent methodological considerations. Chapters 2 and 3 are presented as 
empirical manuscripts. The studies in Chapter 2 use an established resource distribution task, the 
Dictator Game, to assess whether 4-year-old children’s preferences are influenced by the 
preferences of their peers. The studies in Chapter 3 introduce two new resources distribution 
tasks adapted from the fairness and prosociality literature to assess value discrimination in 3-
year-old children. The first of three studies uses this value discrimination methodology to assess 
whether children differentially distribute two resources (stickers) based on an a priori preference 
for one of the resources. The second study uses this methodology to test whether children utilize 
information garnered from their peers’ preferences (e.g., their likes and dislikes) to inform their 
valuations of the resources. The third study investigates whether children incorporate peers’ 
preferences into their own choices. Chapter 4 provides a synthesis of this work, insight into 
future directions, and general conclusions. 
Overview of Value Discrimination Methodologies 
 If young children assign values to options, and if this value is potentially influenced by 
other’s preferences, a key question concerns how to elicit these value judgments. There is a long 
history of eliciting value judgments from adults in cognitive and evolutionary psychology, 
though most traditional adult valuation methodologies are not feasible to use with children. 
Many tasks have complicated instructions that require advanced verbal comprehension and task 




assessing value in adults, asking which option someone would pay more money for, becomes 
substantially more complicated to extend to young children because of their tenuous grasp of the 
symbolic nature of money or tokens. Another common methodological approach utilizes 
temporal discounting, which assesses option value as a function of availability at particular 
points in time (e.g., one smaller reward now versus a larger reward later; see Schultz, 2010, for a 
review). However, temporal discounting tasks are complex, sensitive to individual differences in 
self-control and cognitive control, and findings from studies with children are sparse and 
inconsistent (see Scheres, Tontsch, Thoeny, & Sumiya, 2014, for a review). Nevertheless, there 
is one methodological approach, resource distribution, which is widely utilized in the extant 
adult literature and also holds promise for use in value discrimination in children.  
Resource distribution tasks have become increasingly popular in developmental research 
as a means of investigating fairness and prosocial behavior in young children. One task in 
particular, the Dictator Game (DG), has been used with children between 3 to 9 years of age to 
test questions pertaining to altruism and fairness (Aguilar-Pardo, Martínez-Arias, & Colmenares, 
2013; Benenson, Pascoe, & Radmore, 2007; Chen, Zhu, & Chen, 2013; Kogut, 2012; Lucas, 
Wagner, & Chow, 2008), moral emotions such as guilt and sympathy (Gummerum, Hanoch, 
Keller, Parsons, & Hummel, 2010; Ongley & Malti, 2014), and ownership and group 
membership (Benozio & Diesendruck, 2015). Further, in one of the only studies to directly 
assess value discrimination in young children, Blake and Rand (2010) used the DG to test 
whether children’s own preferences for resources influenced their distribution of those resources.    
In the DG participants are given a finite set of resources to distribute between themselves 
and another individual (the recipient). A utilitarian model would predict that the rational course 




robust evidence to the contrary; a meta-analysis of more than 100 published manuscripts 
revealed that adults in the DG distribute an average of 25-35% of the resources to the recipient 
(Engel, 2011). Similar findings have been reported in children (e.g., Blake & Rand, 2010; 
Gummerum et al., 2010; Ongley & Malti, 2014), however, one developmental trend has 
emerged. Younger children tend to keep more resources than older children (Benenson et al., 
2007), and specifically, younger children keep all of the resources more frequently than older 
children (Blake & Rand; Gummerum et al.; Ongley & Malti). However, whether younger 
children keep all of the resources due to increased levels of selfishness, task demands, and/or 
because they value the resources more highly than older children remains unknown. 
Blake and Rand (2010) used the DG to investigate 3- to 6-year-old children’s distribution 
patterns for resources that (ostensibly) differed in value. Children first identified their favorite 
and least-favorite stickers, and were then given either 10 of their favorite or 10 of their least-
favorite stickers to distribute between themselves and another child. They found that children 
gave fewer of their favorite stickers to the other child, suggesting they assigned a higher value to 
their favorites stickers and found giving them away to be more costly. In contrast, children gave 
significantly more of their least-favorite stickers, indicating a willingness to share provided the 
cost was not too high. Further, Blake and Rand found that a majority of 4-year-old children 
distributed at least one sticker, and the proportion of favorite and least-favorite stickers those 
children distributed did not differ from older children. Thus, these findings suggest the DG is a 
potentially feasible measure for assessing value discrimination in 4-year-old children.   
Importantly, if the DG can be used to assess value discrimination between resources for 
which children hold an a priori preference, then it can presumably also be used to assess whether 




presented in Chapter 2 uses the DG to assess whether 4-year-old children differentially distribute 
resources for which they observed other children like or dislike. Children completed two rounds 
of the DG; one round with 10 stickers their peers liked and one round with 10 stickers their peers 
disliked. If peers preferences influenced children’s own preferences, it was expected that 
children would keep more of the stickers their peers liked than stickers their peers disliked.  
The DG paradigm was chosen for the present research because it was previously used to 
test value discrimination in children. However, it has several significant limitations. The first 
limitation is that it tests value discrimination via preferences, with the assumption that children 
prefer resources of higher value and thus will opt to keep more of those resources for themselves. 
Whereas preferences are likely to reflect the underlying value assigned to options, assessing 
value discrimination via preferences might incidentally test a multitude of factors beyond value 
acquisition via peers’ preferences. For children’s preferences to be influenced by the preferences 
of their peers, children must first recognize that their peers’ preferences (their likes and dislikes) 
provide meaningful information about the values of the options. Then children must factor that 
value information into their own subjective valuations, as one of the many dimensions that 
comprise value. If these other dimensions factor heavily into children’s preferences, that could 
substantially reduce any weight children place on the information provided via peers, making 
their influence difficult to detect in an experimental manipulation.  
A second limitation of the DG concerns its usefulness to capture fine-grained 
discriminations between value judgments. Allotting 10 resources to children to distribute in each 
of two rounds of the DG could result in a myriad of outcomes. Thus, this method has the 
potential to capture large differences in resource valuation. For example, if children tended to 




provide strong evidence that children were using others’ preferences to inform their behavior. 
However, the DG allows children to keep all, half, or none of the resources in each round, and 
between rounds children can keep equivalent quantities of resources. Each of these outcomes is 
problematic from the perspective of trying to evaluate value discrimination. Previous research 
already indicates that young children often keep all of the resources for themselves (e.g., 
Benenson et al., 2007; Blake and Rand, 2010). Thus, it is possible that children could assign a 
higher value to one of the two options, yet still keep all of them. Furthermore, any equal 
distribution within or between rounds will suffer that same difficulty with interpretation. Thus, 
whereas assessing children’s distribution patterns when they are given the freedom to distribute 
multiple resources in multiple ways could indicate that children strongly favor one resource over 
the other, it is also possible that children could distribute resources in such a way (i.e., equal 
distributions) that cannot provide information about their resource valuation.  
A third limitation pertains to the feasibility of using the DG with children under 4 years 
of age. When Blake and Rand (2010) assessed distribution patterns between children’s favorite 
and least-favorite sticker, they found no age differences in the pattern of distribution among 
those children who distributed at least one sticker. However, fewer than 50% of the 3-year-old 
children they tested distributed at least one sticker, whereas more than 75% of the 6-year-old 
children distributed at least one sticker. Thus, whereas the DG might be a feasible resource 
distribution method to use with older children, the lack of variability in younger children’s 
responses makes it problematic to use this task with 3-year-old children. 
Finally, in the DG, children must contend with competing desires to keep resources for 
themselves and behave prosocially by giving resources to the recipient. Whereas these 




behavior, they are not necessary to assess value discrimination. Indeed, these demands might 
serve to add substantial noise, rendering the DG ill suited as a measure of value discrimination. 
Thus, despite the benefits of using an established methodology, the limitations of the DG also 
indicate a need to develop additional measures to assess value discrimination in young children. 
Ideally, these tasks would have reduced task demands, a reduced range of potential responses, be 
appropriate for children younger than 4 years of age, and assess value in a way that does not 
necessarily invoke children’s preferences. 
There are several measures that meet some of the aforementioned criteria. One measure is 
to ask children which options they would choose for themselves, either to play with temporarily 
or to keep. Another would be to assess which options they would work harder, faster, or expend 
more energy on to acquire. However, both of these methodologies are based on the assumption 
that children will necessarily want to acquire resources of higher value for themselves. Whereas 
this is presumed to generally be true, it is also possible that children can understand the generally 
agreed upon value of an option without necessarily desiring that option for themselves. In 
contrast, there is one resource distribution methodology – having children distribute resources to 
others – that eliminates children’s own desires to acquire the resources from their decision-
making processes. Further, this method could be simplified to children distributing two resources 
between two agents. This would serve to reduce task demands, the potential range of responses, 
and be appropriate for testing value discrimination in 3-year-old children.  
In recent years, several resource distribution tasks designed to assess fairness and 
prosociality in children younger than 4 years of age have been developed. The general findings 
from these studies are that young children, in the absence of other information, expect that a set 




Surian, 2011; Sloane et al., 2012; Sommerville et al., 2013). Similar findings have emerged from 
behavioral studies. When children are given the opportunity to distribute even quantities of 
resources, they tend to divide the resources equally between the recipients (e.g., Kenward & 
Dahl, 2011; Olson & Spelke, 2008). Further, there are several studies in which researchers 
manipulated both the quantity of resources to be distributed and characteristics of the recipients. 
These studies are based on two assumptions: (1) that a larger quantity is more valuable than a 
smaller quantity, and (2) that children will differentially choose to reward a prosocial agent over 
one who was not prosocial (or, conversely, punish the agent who was not prosocial). Kenward 
and Dahl found that 4.5-year-old children gave more biscuits to a puppet who helped an agent 
than to one who hindered that agent when the children were allotted an odd number of biscuits to 
distribute. Children justified their actions with statements about the prosocial and antisocial 
behaviors of each puppet, suggesting they chose to reward the prosocial puppet with more 
biscuits and/or punish the antisocial puppet with fewer biscuits. In a similar merit-based task, 
Baumard, Mascaro, and Chevallier (2012) found that 3- and 4-year-old children opted to give a 
bigger cookie to a person who worked harder to bake the cookies and a smaller cookie to a 
person who did not work as hard. Here, the researchers operated under the assumption that 
children would find the bigger cookie to be of higher value, and concluded that children used the 
larger cookie to reward the person who worked harder. Together, these findings suggest that 
children can use resource value, as indicated by resource quantity, to differentially distribute 
resources between two agents. Specifically, children appear to use resource value to reward 
prosocial agents and/or punish non-prosocial agents. Thus, it might be possible to employ these 
types of tasks to assess value discrimination in circumstances in which the resources do not 




The studies presented in Chapter 3 use methods adapted from the fairness and 
prosociality literature to test children’s resource distribution across two independent value 
discrimination tasks. The methods are based on the assumption that children will use resource 
value to reward prosocial agents and/or punish non-prosocial agents. In each task, children 
viewed one agent who behaved in a prosocial manner (e.g., gave a gift, cleaned up blocks), and 
is thus potentially deserving of a higher-valued reward; the other agent did not behave 
prosocially (e.g., did not give a gift, did not clean up blocks). Then children distributed two 
resources between the two agents.  
The first study in Chapter 3 directly tests the assumption that children would distribute an 
(ostensibly) higher-valued resource to a prosocial agent by investigating how 3-year-old children 
distribute two stickers – their a priori favorite and least-favorite stickers – between the prosocial 
and non-prosocial agent. If use their subjective value to differentially distribute the stickers, it 
was expected that children would distribute their favorite – higher-valued – sticker to the 
prosocial agent in both tasks. The second study investigates whether 3-year-old children 
differentially distribute stickers they observed other children like or dislike. If other children’s 
preferences influenced children’s valuations of the stickers, it was expected that children would 
differentially distribute the sticker liked by other children to the prosocial agent, and the sticker 
disliked by other children to the non-prosocial agent. Crucially, in these tasks, children 
distributed either the liked sticker or the disliked sticker (each contrasted with a new, neutral 
sticker). By not directly contrasting the liked and disliked stickers, it is possible to assess 
whether children might increase their valuation of the liked sticker, decrease their valuation of 
the disliked sticker, or both. The third study in Chapter 3 investigates whether other children’s 




peers liked and disliked, children were directly asked which sticker they prefer. Children were 
also asked which sticker they thought a new child would prefer. This direct approach was 
designed to complement the indirect measures implemented in the first two studies. Together, 
these studies provide new insight into 3-year-old children’s economic reasoning and highlight 
several ways in which the preferences of peers influence children’s developing valuations. 
 The studies that comprise this dissertation aimed to establish new methodologies for 
assessing value discrimination in preschool-aged children, and used these methodologies to 
determine whether children assign stable relative to objects and whether their valuations of 
objects can be influenced by their peers preferences. The work in this dissertation was conceived 
of and carried out by Laura Hennefield. Chapters 2 and 3 are presented as empirical manuscripts, 
which will be revised for publication with Laura Hennefield as the first author and Lori Markson 
as the second author. Laura Hennefield generated the theoretical questions of interest, 
determined the experimental design, conducted all data collection and analyses, and wrote up the 
findings. Lori Markson was involved in discussions of this project at every level, from the 
theoretical underpinnings to methodological design and data analyses, offered invaluable advice, 






Aguilar-Pardo, D., Martínez-Arias, R., & Colmenares, F. (2013). The role of inhibition in young 
children’s altruistic behaviour. Cognitive Processing, 14(3), 301–307. doi:10.1007/s10339-
013-0552-6 
Baumard, N., Mascaro, O., & Chevallier, C. (2012). Preschoolers are able to take merit into 
account when distributing goods. Developmental Psychology, 48(2), 492–498. 
doi:10.1037/a0026598 
Benenson, J. F., Pascoe, J., & Radmore, N. (2007). Children's altruistic behavior in the dictator 
game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 28(3), 168–175. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.10.003 
Benozio, A., & Diesendruck, G. (2015). Parochialism in preschool boys' resource allocation. 
Evolution and Human Behavior, 1–9. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.12.002 
Birch, S. A. J., Vauthier, S. A., & Bloom, P. (2008). Three- and four-year-olds spontaneously 
use others’ past performance to guide their learning. Cognition, 107(3), 1018–1034. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.12.008 
Blake, P. R., & McAuliffe, K. (2011). “I had so much it didn't seem fair”: Eight-year-olds reject 
two forms of inequity. Cognition, 120(2), 215–224. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.04.006 
Blake, P. R., & Rand, D. G. (2010). Currency value moderates equity preference among young 
children. Evolution and Human Behavior, 1–11. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.06.012 
Chen, Y., Zhu, L., & Chen, Z. (2013). Family income affects children's altruistic behavior in the 
dictator game. PLoS ONE, 8(11), 1–8. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080419 
Corriveau, K. H., Fusaro, M., & Harris, P. L. (2009). Going with the flow: Preschoolers prefer 
nondissenters as informants. Psychological Science, 20(3), 372–377. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2009.02291.x 
Engel, C. (2011). Dictator games: A meta study. Experimental Economics, 14(4), 583–610. 
doi:10.1007/s10683-011-9283-7 
Engelmann, J. M., Herrmann, E., & Tomasello, M. (2012). Five-year olds, but not chimpanzees, 
attempt to manage their reputations. PLoS One, 7, e48433. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048433  
Engelmann, J. M., Over, H., Herrmann, E., & Tomasello, M. (2013). Young children care more 
about their reputation with ingroup members and potential reciprocators. Developmental 





Geraci, A., & Surian, L. (2011). The developmental roots of fairness: Infants’ reactions to equal 
and unequal distributions of resources. Developmental Science, 14(5), 1012–1020. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01048.x 
Gummerum, M., Hanoch, Y., Keller, M., Parsons, K., & Hummel, A. (2010). Preschoolers’ 
allocations in the dictator game: The role of moral emotions. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 31(1), 25–34. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2009.09.002 
Haun, D. B. M., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Conformity to peer pressure in preschool children. 
Child Development, 82(6), 1759–1767. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01666.x 
House, B., Henrich, J., Sarnecka, B., & Silk, J. B. (2013). The development of contingent 
reciprocity in children. Evolution and Human Behavior, 34(2), 86–93. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2012.10.001 
Jaswal, V. K., & Neely, L. A. (2006). Adults don't always know best: Preschoolers use past 
reliability over age when learning new words. Psychological Science, 17(9), 757–758. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01778.x 
Keil, F., Stein, C., Webb, L., Billings, V. D., & Rozenblit, L. (2008). Discerning the division of 
cognitive labor: An emerging understanding of how knowledge is clustered in other minds. 
Cognitive Science, 32(2), 259–300. doi:10.1080/03640210701863339 
Kenward, B., & Dahl, M. (2011). Preschoolers distribute scarce resources according to the moral 
valence of recipients' previous actions. Developmental Psychology, 47(4), 1054–1064. 
doi:10.1037/a0023869 
Kinzler, K. D., Corriveau, K. H., & Harris, P. L. (2010). Children’s selective trust in native-
accented speakers. Developmental Science, 14(1), 106–111. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2010.00965.x 
Koenig, M. A., & Harris, P. L. (2005). Preschoolers mistrust ignorant and inaccurate speakers. 
Child Development, 76(6), 1261–1277. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2005.00849.x 
Kogut, T. (2012). Knowing what I should, doing what I want: From selfishness to inequity 
aversion in young children's sharing behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology, 33(1), 226–
236. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.10.003 
Leimgruber, K. L., Shaw, A., Santos, L. R., & Olson, K. R. (2012). Young children are more 
generous when others are aware of their actions. PLoS ONE, 7(10), e48292. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048292  
LoBue, V., Nishida, T., Chiong, C., DeLoache, J. S., & Haidt, J. (2009). When getting something 





Lucas, M. M., Wagner, L., & Chow, C. (2008). Fair game: The intuitive economics of resource 
exchange in four-year olds. Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology, 2(3), 
74–88. doi:10.1037/h0099353 
Olson, K. R., & Spelke, E. S. (2008). Foundations of cooperation in young children. Cognition, 
108(1), 222–231. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.12.003 
Ongley, S. F., & Malti, T. (2014). The role of moral emotions in the development of children’s 
sharing behavior. Developmental Psychology, 50(4), 1148–1159. doi:10.1037/a0035191 
Padoa-Schioppa, C. (2011). Neurobiology of economic choice: A good-based model. Annual 
Review of Neuroscience, 34(1), 333–359. doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-061010-113648 
Schaefer, D. R., Light, J. M., Fabes, R. A., Hanish, L. D., & Martin, C. L. (2010). Fundamental 
principles of network formation among preschool children. Social Networks, 32(1), 61–71. 
doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2009.04.003 
Scheres, A., Tontsch, C., Thoeny, A. L., & Sumiya, M. (2014). Temporal reward discounting in 
children, adolescents, and emerging adults during an experiential task. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 5, 1–35. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00711 
Schultz, W. (2010). Subjective neuronal coding of reward: temporal value discounting and risk. 
European Journal of Neuroscience, 31(12), 2124–2135. doi:10.1111/j.1460-
9568.2010.07282.x 
Sloane, S., Baillargeon, R., & Premack, D. (2012). Do infants have a sense of fairness? 
Psychological Science, 23(2), 196–204. doi:10.1177/0956797611422072 
Sobel, D. M., & Kushnir, T. (2013). Knowledge matters: How children evaluate the reliability of 
testimony as a process of rational inference. Psychological Review, 120(4), 779–797. 
doi:10.1037/a0034191 
Sommerville, J. A., Schmidt, M. F. H., Yun, J.-E., & Burns, M. (2013). The development of 
fairness expectations and prosocial behavior in the second year of life. Infancy, 18(1), 40–66. 
doi:10.1111/j.1532-7078.2012.00129.x 
VanderBorght, M., & Jaswal, V. K. (2009). Who knows best? Preschoolers sometimes prefer 
child informants over adult informants. Infant and Child Development, 18(1), 61–71. 
doi:10.1002/icd.591 
Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2013). The emergence of contingent reciprocity in young 






Chapter 2: Peer influence on young children’s preferences 
We care deeply about what others think about us. Our propensity to create and strengthen 
social connections leads to behaviors that facilitate social bonding and group membership. At the 
same time, we use others’ actions and behaviors as a source of information from which to learn 
about the world. Even very young children are highly motivated to attend to and learn from the 
actions of others – but children are not indiscriminate social learners. Instead, they consider 
factors such as past accuracy (e.g., Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; 
Koenig & Harris, 2005) expertise (e.g., Keil, Stein, Webb, Billings, & Rozenblit, 2008), and 
intention (e.g., Butler & Markman, 2012), when determining from whom to learn. The present 
research investigated whether one particular type of social information – other’s preferences – 
influences preschoolers’ own developing preferences. 
The motivation to attend to and learn from the social world might be unique to humans 
and confer significant adaptive advantages. Learning from others’ preferences might be one such 
adaptive strategy, as children often have to make critical decisions with limited information. 
Preference expression, via such modes as choice behavior and explicitly stating likes or dislikes, 
is common behavior that children frequently observe others’ performing, and thus could be used 
to acquire information. This information could be specific to others’ idiosyncratic likes and 
dislikes, but it could also convey information about the generally agreed upon value about the 
options. If so, children might incorporate information gleaned from observing others’ 
preferences into their own valuation of those options and subsequent preferences. 
One particularly well-suited strategy to both acquire culturally transmitted information 
and strengthen social bonds is to copy a consensus or the majority. There is emerging evidence 




likely to be correct than a minority (van Leeuwen & Haun, 2013). For example, when faced with 
a group of adults labeling the same object, 3-year-old children tend to side with the majority over 
a lone dissenter, even developing distrust of the dissenter (Corriveau, Fusaro, & Harris, 2009). 
Even 2-year-old children are more likely to copy the functional strategy used by a majority of 
peers in a food-retrieval task than one used by a single peer (Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello, 2012). 
Thus, in situations where there is at least one objectively correct response, children seem to learn 
from the statistical prevalence of others’ actions and align their behavior with that of the majority.  
Preferences, in contrast, are subjective; there is no objectively right or wrong answer to a 
question such as, “Which is your favorite sticker?” Thus, an intriguing question is whether young 
children also incorporate the preferences of a majority into their own preferences. On one hand, 
the subjectivity of preferences might render it socially acceptable to hold and maintain a 
preference that is different from the majority. On the other hand, subjective information might be 
more malleable than objective information, and thus social influences might be stronger for 
preference information than objective information. Further, it is plausible that children are more 
likely to be influenced by other children – their peers – with regard to subjective information. 
There is evidence that children are able to consider the content of the material, for example, 
whether they need information about toys or food, when determining whether a child or an adult 
is a better source of information (VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). There is also emerging 
evidence that children engage in behaviors that strengthen social connections and group 
membership with peers, such as conformity (Haun & Tomasello, 2011) and reputation 
management (Engelmann, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2012; Leimgruber, Shaw, Santos, & Olson, 
2012). Thus, in contrast to utilizing adults’ general expertise and authority to acquire factual 




adult, especially in circumstances where similarity to their peers, friendship, and potential for 
future social interactions, might factor into children’s learning. 
Children frequently encounter situations in which others express their preferences, and 
appear sensitive to preferences from a young age. By 18 months children understand that 
preferences are subjective (Graham, Stock, & Henderson, 2006; Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997), and 
by 3 years recognize when others share their preferences (Fawcett & Markson, 2010). Further, 
there is emerging evidence that young children use others’ preferences to acquire information 
about the relative value of options. When given the choice between two options, toddlers choose 
to play with the same objects others have demonstrated a preference for (Fawcett & Markson, 
2009), and preschoolers pick toys and activities that were preferred by children over adults and 
by individuals of the same gender as themselves (Shutts, Banaji, & Spelke, 2009). Preschoolers 
also avoid options that an adult does not choose, suggesting they devalue those options 
(Hennefield & Markson, in press). However, it is not yet known if children incorporate 
information acquired via their peers’ preferences into their own valuation of options and 
subsequent preferences. 
One recent study found that young children use their own a priori explicitly stated 
preferences to guide their option valuations when distributing resources. Blake and Rand (2010) 
investigated 3- to 6-year-old children’s distribution patterns for resources of high- and low-value 
to the child. Using a Dictator Game (DG) paradigm, children identified their favorite and least-
favorite stickers, and were then given either 10 of their favorite or 10 of their least-favorite 
stickers to distribute between themselves and another child. Children gave fewer of their favorite 
stickers to the other child, suggesting they assigned a higher value to their favorites stickers and 




least-favorite stickers, indicating a willingness to share provided the cost was not too high.  
Resource distribution tasks such as the DG have become increasingly popular in 
developmental research as a means of investigating fairness and prosocial behavior in young 
children (Aguilar-Pardo, Martínez-Arias, & Colmenares, 2013; Benenson, Pascoe, & Radmore, 
2007; Benozio & Diesendruck, 2015; Blake & Rand, 2010; Chen, Zhu, & Chen, 2013; 
Gummerum, Hanoch, Keller, Parsons, & Hummel, 2010; Kogut, 2012; Lucas, Wagner, & Chow, 
2008; Ongley & Malti, 2014). Though several studies used candy as the resources (Aguilar-
Pardo et al.; Kogut), most studies have used stickers, as stickers are thought to be highly valued 
by children (Benenson et al.). Similar to the distribution patterns reported in the extant adult 
literature (see Engel, 2011, for a review), one general finding is that children tend to keep 65-
75% of the resources for themselves. However, younger children tend to keep more resources 
than older children (e.g. Benenson et al.), and specifically, younger children keep all of the 
resources more frequently than older children (Blake & Rand; Gummerum et al.; Ongley & 
Malti). When assessing distribution patterns for children’s favorite and least-favorite stickers, 
Blake and Rand found that a majority of 4-year-old children distributed at least one sticker, and 
the proportion of favorite and least-favorite stickers those children distributed did not differ from 
older children. This finding suggests that the DG is a feasible measure for assessing value 
discrimination in 4-year-old children.  
The present study employed the DG to test whether 4-year-old children differentially 
distribute two different resources – one their peers liked and one their peers disliked. Children 
watched a video in which 2 boys and 2 girls sequentially demonstrate the same preferences; each 
liked one specific sticker (liked sticker) and disliked the other (disliked sticker). Then children 




If peers’ preferences influence children’s own preferences, it was expected that children would 
keep more liked than disliked stickers. Further, that finding would suggest that children are 
extracting informational content about the value of the stickers from their peers and using that to 
guide their own preferences. However, if children do not extract informational content from their 
peers preferences, or it does not influence their own preferences, then children would not be 
expected to differentially distribute the liked and disliked stickers.     
Method 
Participants. Seventy-two 4-year-old children participated in either the Experimental (N 
= 48, M = 4;7, Range = 4;0–5;0, 24 girls) or Baseline Condition (N = 24, M = 4;7, Range = 4;1–
5;0, 12 girls). One child was replaced for failing to understand the study instructions. Children 
were recruited from a database of families who had expressed interest in participating in 
developmental research, and were tested in a university laboratory. The majority of children 
were white and from middle-class backgrounds. 
Materials. Square stickers, 22mm x 22mm, were printed with one of two blue designs on 
a white background. The designs, a swirl and snowflake, were chosen to be equally interesting to 
children, yet distinct (see Figure 2.1). Materials for each child consisted of 20 stickers (10 swirl 
and 10 snowflake), a felt board with a circle drawn in the middle, four envelopes, and a privacy 
screen to shield the child from the experimenter during test. 
 
                                        




Social Influence Manipulation (SIM): Short video clips (each 11.6 s) in which four actors 
(children from the community, not professional actors) demonstrated that they liked one sticker 
and disliked another sticker. The actors were two boys and two girls of roughly the same age as 
the participants. Each actor picked up each sticker in turn and examined it while expressing their 
preference. They demonstrated liking by saying in an excited tone, “Oh, cool, I really like this 
one!” and disliking by saying in a negative tone, “Oh, no, I don’t like this one”. The “stickers” in 
the actors’ hands were actually blank squares of paper, but children could not tell this from 
watching the video. As the actor was expressing their first preference, a picture of the sticker 
they were “looking at” appeared onscreen, to the right of the actor, and remained visible for 4 
seconds while they spoke. Then that picture disappeared, a picture of the second sticker appeared 
onscreen to the left of the actor, and again remained visible for 4 seconds while they expressed 
the complementary preference. Thus, the same preference expressions (i.e., each instance of a 
preference being expressed) were counterbalanced to pair with each specific sticker, and all 
children viewed all of the same preference expressions. This ensured that the actors own 
preferences could not influence their preference expressions. This method also had the added 
benefit of equating the length of time allotted to each preference expression in the video. The 
order in which the actors appeared on screen was counterbalanced with the constraint that two 
actors of the same gender did not appear in succession.  
Procedure. Children in the Experimental Condition watched the SIM and then played the 
DG; children in the Baseline Condition only played the DG. All children played two rounds of 
the DG, one round with each sticker design (order counter-balanced). The Baseline Condition 
was included to test for differences between children who had watched the SIM and those who 




board in front of them. The experimenter placed 10 stickers (10 swirls or 10 snowflakes) in a 
circle on the board, and told the child that all the stickers belonged to the child and they were 
going to play a game with them. She placed one envelope on the right side of the board and said, 
“Any stickers you want to keep to take home should go in this envelope”. Then she placed 
another envelope on the left side of the board and said, “Tomorrow there is another girl/boy 
coming here to play. She/He is just like you. Any stickers you want to leave for her/him should 
go in this envelope”. The gender of the other child was matched to the child’s own gender. Then 
the experimenter pointed to the privacy screen and told the child that when the screen was on the 
table no one could see which envelopes they put the stickers into. She verified that the child 
remembered the purpose of each envelope and the screen; if they did not remember she reminded 
them and asked again. Then she placed the screen on the table between herself and the game 
board and told the child to “Go ahead and put all the stickers away”. 
After the child signaled they were done, the experimenter again verified that the child 
remembered to whom each envelope belonged. One child failed this identification and was 
replaced. Then the child placed their envelope under their chair for later, placed the envelope for 
the other child in a large stack of envelopes for anonymity, and played the second round with 10 
stickers of the other design. The only difference between the two rounds was that in the second 
round the child was told that the child they could leave stickers for was different from the child 
in the first round (e.g., “another girl/boy is coming tomorrow”). Finally, in the Experimental 
Condition, after completing both rounds of the DG, the experimenter placed one sticker of each 
design in front of the child and asked them to identify which sticker the kids in the video had 






 If children incorporated the preferences expressed by their peers (in the video) into their 
own preferences, then in the Experimental Condition it was expected that children would keep 
more liked stickers than disliked stickers. The findings support this hypothesis (see Figure 2.2).  
 
 
                               
Figure 2.2. This figure shows the proportion of children in the Experimental and Baseline Conditions who 
kept different quantities of resources, an equal quantity of resources, or all resources between two rounds 
of the Dictator Game. Marginally more children in the Experimental Condition distributed different 
quantities of stickers than children in the Baseline Condition. Critically, In the Experimental Condition, 
significantly more children kept more stickers their peers liked than stickers their peers disliked. 
 
 Of the 48 children in the Experimental Condition, 21 children kept more liked than 
disliked stickers whereas only 7 children kept more disliked than liked stickers. This distribution 
is significantly different from what would be expected by chance, χ2 (1, N = 28) = 7, p = .008. In 
addition, 14 children kept an equal number of liked and disliked stickers, and 6 children kept all 
of the stickers. If a category for the 14 children who kept an equal number of stickers is added to 




7, p = .03. It is unclear how to classify the 6 children who kept all of the stickers. Indeed, some 
researchers differentiate between prosocial (distributing at least one) and non-prosocial (keeping 
all) children, and exclude those non-prosocial children from subsequent analyses (e.g., Blake & 
Rand, 2010; Kogut, 2012). Whereas it is possible that some children are not inclined to give 
regardless of the value of the resources, it is also possible that these 6 children did not 
differentially value the two stickers, or that keeping all the stickers masked any differentiation 
they did make. However, even if these 6 children are conservatively added to the 14 children 
who kept an equal number of stickers, the distribution remains significantly different from 
chance, χ2 (2, N = 48) = 7.625, p = .022. There were no significant differences or interactions 
with regard to resource distribution as a function of round order. Overall, these analyses indicate 
that children were influenced by their peers’ preferences such that more children systematically 
kept more of the stickers their peers liked than those they disliked, and this finding persists even 
when conservatively including all children (that is, those who did not distribute any stickers) in 
the analyses. 
Of the 24 children in the Baseline Condition, only 8 children kept a different number of 
stickers between the two rounds, 10 children kept an equal number, and 6 children kept all the 
stickers. Further analyses revealed that children’s distribution patterns in the Experimental 
Condition differed from their distribution patterns in the Baseline Condition. For both conditions, 
the number of children who kept a different quantity of stickers across both rounds was 
calculated (Experimental = 28; Baseline = 8) and compared to the number of children who kept 
an equal quantity (or all) stickers across both rounds (Experimental = 20, Baseline = 16). These 
distributions are marginally different from each other, Fisher’s Exact p = .079, which suggests 




different quantities of stickers in the two subsequent rounds of the DG than children in the 
Baseline Condition who had not viewed the SIM. More convincingly, in the Baseline Condition, 
all 8 children who kept a different quantity of stickers kept more in the second round than the 
first round. However, in the Experimental Condition, 14 children kept more stickers in the first 
round (67%; 11 were children who distributed the liked-stickers first). That finding suggests that 
the SIM overrode children’s tendencies to keep more stickers as the game progressed.  
There were no gender differences in either the Experimental or Baseline Condition, nor 
were there differences in either condition as a function of sticker type. Interestingly, whereas 
there is clear evidence that children differentiated between the liked and disliked stickers in their 
distribution patterns, this difference is only weakly reflected in the mean number of stickers they 
kept. Children, on average, kept 6.5 liked stickers and 6.1 disliked stickers, t (1) = 1.538, p = 
.131. In the Baseline Condition children kept an average of 6.75 stickers, which is not 
significantly different from either the liked or disliked stickers. Further, the modal number of 
stickers kept in all conditions was 5 (31.25% of all distributions), indicating that many children 
in the present sample possessed a strong desire to distribute resources equally. This preference 
for equal distribution is commonly found in third party resource distribution tasks where children 
divide resources between two recipients (e.g., Kenward & Dahl, 2011; Olson & Spelke, 2008), 
but this preference is often less robust in the DG (e.g., Benenson et al., 2007; Blake & Rand, 
2010). Thus, the main finding that more children kept more of the liked than disliked stickers is 
especially notable because it indicates that peers’ preferences play a significant yet subtle role in 
influencing children’s behavior.   
General Discussion 




4-year-old children’s own preferences. After viewing four peers express the same preference for 
one of two stickers, more children subsequently kept more of the stickers their peers liked than 
the stickers their peers disliked. This pattern was not due to children holding an a priori 
preference for one of the stickers or an artifact of playing multiple rounds of the dictator game. 
Thus, the findings indicate that children’s resource distribution behavior was significantly 
affected by the preferences of their peers.  
One way in which peers’ preferences might influence children’s own preferences is by 
affecting the underlying value children assign to the options. Value, for the present purposes, is 
defined as the relative importance, usefulness, or worth of an option (e.g., a good or service). 
There is substantial evidence that, rather than being a fixed attribute, values are computed at the 
time a choice is made, based on multiple parameters such as characteristics of the option, 
quantity, temporal availability, and current motivational state of the individual (e.g., Padoa-
Schioppa, 2011). Thus, it is plausible that children in the present study used their peers’ 
preferences to increase their relative valuation of the liked sticker and/or decrease their relative 
valuation of the disliked sticker. In this account, children’s valuations for the options were 
influenced by their peers’ preferences, and children subsequently used these value judgments to 
inform their own preferences.   
If children’s option valuations were influenced by their peers that raises several questions 
for further consideration. The first question concerns whether children increased their relative 
valuation of the option their peers liked, decreased their valuation of the option their peers 
disliked, or both. The DG could have potentially offered insight into this question if children’s 
distribution patterns for the liked or disliked stickers differed significantly from either the 




differences in children’s distribution patterns were only weakly reflected in the mean number of 
stickers they kept, it is not clear that the patterns observed in the present study fully captured 
children’s value discrimination. Potential distinctions between liked and disliked information are 
important, however, because there is considerable evidence that both adults and children use 
positive and negative information in substantially different ways to reason about the world. In 
particular, this difference manifests in a negativity bias in which negative information is learned 
and used to a greater degree than positive information (see Vaish, Grossmann, & Woodward, 
2008, for a review). Thus, if the negativity bias extends to preference information, it would be 
expected that children would devalue the option their peers disliked to a greater extent than they 
increase their valuation of the option their peers liked. However, if children consider subjective 
assessments of the options to be accurate and reliable indicators of the value of the options, they 
might both devalue options others disliked and increase their valuation for options others liked. 
Further, the contrast between the two types of preference expressions might serve to highlight 
differences between the two options and facilitate or compound value differentiation.  
 A second question concerns the consistency and quantity of the information children 
might need in order to acquire value information from observing others’ preferences. In the 
present study, the information children received about their peers’ preferences was consistent 
across four peers. There is substantial evidence that young children are able to use statistical 
information to inform their learning, and this extends to using statistical information to infer 
others’ preferences (Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, 2010; Ma & Xu, 2011). However, whether 
children attended to the internal consistency of the preference information (i.e., within-individual 
consistency) or the proportion of individuals who expressed a particular preference (i.e., 




conformity has found a minimum of three informants necessary to elicit conformist behavior in 
adults (e.g., Asch, 1956). Four informants were used in the present study to equate gender, 
however it is unclear whether children needed to view four different peers in order to be 
influenced by their preferences. One possibility is that, because the peers were strangers, children 
might have attended to the quantity and consistency of the preferences to a greater degree than 
they would if the peers were familiar and known to the child. Future studies are needed to clarify 
the impact of informant attributes on children’s option valuations and preferences.        
Alternatively, children’s responses in the present study could have been driven by the 
social dynamics of the experimental context. Peers’ preferences might influence children’s 
understanding of what other children value, and children could have used this information to 
infer how they should respond. There is some evidence that 4-year-old children will publically 
conform to their peers, even when they know their peers are wrong (Haun & Tomasello, 2011), 
and that 5-year-old children strategically manage their reputations, sharing more with recipients 
who could reciprocate later, and when being observed by ingroup over outgroup members 
(Engelmann, Over, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2013). Thus, it is possible that children used the 
most salient information afforded to them in this experiment, the SIM, to figure out how to most 
appropriately distribute the resources. It is also possible that children considered the disliked 
stickers to undesirable, and thus considered not giving them away to be prosocial behavior. 
Whereas the present study cannot definitively rule out these possibilities, neither explanation 
would predict the specific distribution pattern that was found. If children’s responses were solely 
or primarily guided by reputational concerns, then differences in children’s distribution of the 
liked and disliked stickers most likely would have been more pronounced than they were. 




might have been expected to have kept more disliked than liked stickers, as they would not 
benefit from giving the disliked stickers away. Thus, whereas children might have considered 
their reputation and preferences of the recipient when determining how many resources to 
distribute, it is unlikely those factors fully account for the pattern of results obtained in this 
study.  
 There is a wealth of timely and pertinent information available via the social domain, and 
strategically extracting and utilizing such information could yield adaptive advantages. The 
present research indicates that young children can use social information – specifically, peers’ 
preferences – to inform their relative valuation of options and subsequent preferences. Research 
on children’s learning in social contexts has primarily focused on the factual information that 
children learn from adults (e.g., Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). However, peers comprise an essential 
component of children’s social networks, and understanding the contexts and type of information 
that children might learn from their peers is crucial to a comprehensive understanding of social 
cognitive development. This study offers a first look at the influence of peers on young 
children’s developing preferences, and the findings suggest that, indeed, children do consider 
their peers’ preferences to provide value-laden information. Further, whereas peers’ preferences 
might denote the generally agreed upon value of the options, it is also possible that their 
preferences inform children of culture-specific valuations. Thus, acquiring information about the 
value of options via social contexts might also serve to facilitate the cultural transmission of 
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Chapter 3: The influence of peers on 3-year-old children’s object valuations 
Children frequently need to choose between options for which they know very little about 
– for example, deciding which toy to play with or which food to eat. Other individuals often have 
to make those very same decisions. Thus, observing others’ preferences might be a particularly 
adaptive strategy for acquiring information about those options. This information could be 
specific to others’ idiosyncratic likes and dislikes, but it could also convey information about the 
generally agreed upon value of the options. If so, children might incorporate information gleaned 
from observing others’ preference into their own subjective valuation of those options. 
Value, for the present purpose, is defined as the relative importance, usefulness, or worth 
of an option (e.g., a good or service). Value discrimination is a comparison of two or more 
options that vary on multiple dimensions; economic choice is the decision that results from such 
comparison. Thus, values, as such, are computed at the time a choice is made, based on multiple 
dimensions, including attributes of the option, quantity, temporal availability, and current 
motivational state (e.g., Padoa-Schioppa, 2011). The primary goal for the present research was to 
assess whether one particular type of social information – the preferences of other children  – 
factors into the relative subjective value that children assign to options.  
We focused on the preferences of children for two reasons. First, there is substantial 
evidence that children are not indiscriminate learners – they consider factors such as past 
reliability (e.g., Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig & Harris, 
2005), expertise (e.g., Keil, Stein, Webb, Billings, & Rozenblit, 2008), consensus with a majority 
(Corriveau, Fusaro, & Harris, 2009), and even group membership (Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 
2010), in determining from whom to learn. Further, children are also able to consider the content 




determining whether a child or an adult is a better source of information (VanderBorght & 
Jaswal, 2009). Thus, children might selectively learn from the object preferences of their peers 
over those of an adult. Second, peers are critical to the fabric of young children’s social 
environment. Preschool children form complex social networks, which include strong reciprocal 
friendships with a limited number of peers, relationships with friends of friends, and hierarchies 
of popularity (Schaefer, Light, Fabes, Hanish, & Martin, 2010). There is also emerging evidence 
that children engage in behaviors that strengthen social connections and group membership, such 
as conformity (Haun & Tomasello, 2011) and reputation management (Engelmann, Herrmann, & 
Tomasello, 2012; Leimgruber, Shaw, Santos, & Olson, 2012; Engelmann, Over, Herrmann, & 
Tomasello, 2013). Research on children’s learning in social contexts has primarily focused on 
factual information that children learn from adults (e.g., Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). However, as 
peers comprise an essential component of children’s social networks, understanding the contexts 
and type of information that children might learn from peers is crucial to a comprehensive 
understanding of social cognitive development. The present research aims to address this gap and 
provide insight into one context, preference, in which children might learn from their peers.    
The goal of this introduction is to provide an overview of two disparate literatures: 
children’s economic understanding and social influence on children’s preferences. Recent 
research demonstrates that 4-year-old children can use their own a priori explicitly stated 
preferences to guide their option valuations when distributing resources between themselves and 
another child (Blake & Rand, 2010). The present work introduces two resources distribution 
tasks adapted from the fairness and prosociality literature to assess value discrimination in 3-
year-old children. In the first of three studies, we assessed whether children differentially 




Specifically, we tested whether children would use resource value to systematically reward a 
prosocial agent and/or punish a non-prosocial agent (Study 1). Using the resource distribution 
methodology devised for Study 1, we then investigated whether children utilize information 
garnered from their peers’ preferences (e.g., their likes and dislikes) to inform their valuations of 
the resources (Study 2). Finally, I contrasted the indirect value assessment methodology from 
Studies 1 and 2 with a more direct approach, and also tested whether children’s own preferences 
were influenced by their peers’ preferences (Study 3). Together, these studies provide new 
insight into children’s early economic reasoning, and highlight key ways in which social 
information influences children’s developing valuations.  
Children’s Economic Understanding 
Historically, economic understanding has been thought to arise rather late in 
development, as children do not appear to have a firm grasp of concepts such as money, supply 
and demand, and price until the late elementary school or adolescent years (e.g., Berti & Bombi, 
1981; Siegler & Thompson, 1998). In one early study, Burris (1983) conducted interviews with 
4- to 12-year-old-children in which they were presented with pairs of objects and asked which 
would cost more. Four- to 5-year-old children tended to base their evaluations on physical 
characteristics, such as asserting that a diamond does not cost much “because it’s so tiny”. 
Seven-year-old children often gave responses that included a functional component, such as a 
wristwatch costs more than a book “because you can tell time on a watch, but a book you can 
just read”. By 11-years of age, children frequently responded by offering accounts of production, 
such as shoes costing more than candy because “candy is easier to make, but a pair of shoes 
takes a pretty long time”. Another study found that most 9-year-old children understood 




outcompeting other sellers, whereas 5-year-old children did not (Thompson & Siegler, 2000). 
Notably, a majority of this early research focused heavily on children’s understanding of adults’ 
concepts of economics, rather than components that might underlie intuitive economic 
understanding.    
Intuitive economics refers to the representations and mechanisms underlying core 
knowledge of economic value and exchange (Lucas, Wagner, & Chow, 2008). Whereas 
significant attention has been given to infants and young children’s intuitions regarding areas 
such as physics (e.g., Baillargeon, 2004; Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992), 
agency (e.g., Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995; Woodward, 1998), and number (e.g., 
Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004; Sarnecka & Carey, 2008), little research has explored 
questions regarding intuitive economics. Whether the same concepts and mechanisms that 
underlie intuitive economics are used later in development to inform adults’ economic 
understanding has also not been explored. However, it is likely that at least one fundamental 
component of economic understanding, that of economic valuation, is both present early, and 
maintains a central role in economic understanding throughout development. 
There are several simple heuristics that infants might use to assign differential value to 
options prior to acquiring, or in addition to utilizing, more complex strategies. One such heuristic 
is a quantitative “more-is-more” heuristic in which a larger quantity of a given item is considered 
more valuable than a smaller quantity of that same item. In a study designed to investigate 
numerical representation, Feigenson, Carey, and Hauser (2002) tested 10 and 12-month-old 
infants choices between different quantities of the same item. Infants viewed different quantities 
of crackers (e.g., 1-vs-2, 2-vs-3, 3-vs-6) being placed in opaque containers and were then 




in the 1-vs-2 and 2-vs-3 conditions, suggesting that infants are able to represent these smaller 
quantities and make value judgments about them. In a follow-up condition, infants were 
presented with one huge cracker vs two much smaller crackers, and one large cracker vs two 
smaller crackers that together equaled the size of the larger cracker. In the former, infants chose 
the huge cracker over the two small crackers – opting for the container with the largest overall 
mass of cracker, and in the latter infants chose equally between the options. These findings offer 
preliminary evidence that infants engage in economic valuation. Further, infants do not appear to 
employ a straightforward numerical “more-is-more” heuristic when comparing discrete 
quantities of items, but rather evaluate the total mass of the items they are choosing between 
when deciding which option is greater in quantity.  
The extant literature on fairness and prosociality in early childhood also offers evidence 
that infants and young children engage in economic valuation. Economic valuation is crucial for 
understanding fairness and reciprocity. Without knowing the value of a resource, one is limited 
in they ways they are able to assess whether resources were distributed fairly or whether 
someone has adequately reciprocated a favor, and infants appear to have some understanding of 
both of those concepts from an early age. Sommerville and colleagues (Sommerville, Schmidt, 
Yun, & Burns, 2013) investigated whether infants have a functional understanding of fairness via 
equal distribution of objects in third-party tasks. The researchers found that 15-month-old infants 
looked longer, potentially indicating surprise, when resources were distributed unequally 
between two adults compared to when they were distributed equally. Similarly, Sloane, 
Baillargeon, and Premack (2012) demonstrated that 19-month-old infants seemed to expect an 
experimenter to allocate two items equally between two individuals, but not between two 




resource than someone else and will attempt to correct the situation (LoBue, Nishida, Chiong, 
DeLoache, & Haidt, 2009). These findings indicate that infants and young children expect and 
desire resources to be distributed equally between recipients.  
Several recent studies have also investigated young children’s resource distribution in 
contexts in which children might not consider distributions of equal quantities to be fair. For 
example, Kenward and Dahl (2011) found that 4.5-year-old children gave more biscuits to a 
puppet who helped an agent than to one who hindered that agent. The preschoolers justified their 
actions with statements about the prosocial and antisocial behaviors of each puppet, suggesting 
they chose to reward the prosocial puppet with more biscuits and/or punish the antisocial puppet 
with fewer biscuits. Kanngiesser and Warneken (2012) had children work with a puppet to 
complete a task, and contrasted conditions in which either the puppet worked harder, or the child 
worked harder. In a subsequent distribution task, both 3- and 5-year-old children kept more 
stickers for themselves when they worked harder, and shared more when the puppet worked 
harder. This finding provides additional support for the claim that children viewed the resources 
as having value and used this value to reward the puppet in the condition where the puppet 
worked harder. In a similar merit-based task, Baumard, Mascaro, and Chevallier (2012) found 
that 3- and 4-year-old children opted to give a bigger cookie to an agent who worked harder to 
bake the cookies and a smaller cookie to an agent who did not work as hard. Here, the 
researchers operated under the assumption that children would find the bigger cookie to be of 
higher value, and concluded that children used the larger cookie to reward the agent who worked 
harder. Regarding reciprocity, 3-year-old children prefer to share resources with people who 
have shared with them (direct reciprocity) and people who have shared with others (indirect 




children engage in intuitive economic valuation. They appear to understand that the total value of 
a larger quantity of a given resource is different from a smaller quantity of that same resource, 
and that resource value can be used to reward prosocial behaviors such as sharing and hard work.       
Finally, in an extensive cross-cultural study on children’s fairness in resource 
distribution, Rochat et al. (2009) examined how children from seven different cultures shared 
small collections of items. Some collections contained all the same basic items and some 
collections included “special” items thought to be highly desirable to children (e.g., bigger and 
more brightly colored candies and stickers), and thus of higher value. Whereas there was some 
cultural variation, researchers found that across all samples, 3-year-old children tended to keep a 
larger quantity of items for themselves than they gave to others, and also kept more of the highly 
valued items for themselves. Further, when asked to divide the items into two collections, and 
told that the experimenter would select a collection first leaving the child with the non-selected 
collection, children overwhelmingly divided the items equally between the collections. Together, 
these finding provide additional evidence that young children assign value options, they can use 
value to create equal or unequal distributions depending on the context, they prefer higher-valued 
options for themselves, and that, cross-culturally, children use quantity – number and size – in 
their value assessments.  
 Whereas heuristics might play an important role in infants’ early economic valuation, and 
possibly offer stable evolutionary strategies (e.g., van Leeuwen & Haun, 2013), simple 
computations are not likely adequate to explain complex economic valuations. Thus, it is also 
crucial to consider how additional information, such as context, might be incorporated into value 
judgments. For example, the manner in which a choice is framed (Tversky & Kahnemann, 1981) 




influence the values adults assign to options. Thus, it is clear that value is not a set property 
affixed to specific options, but rather operates in relation to other options in the broader context 
in which one is making such an evaluation. As the social environment is a salient component of 
context, it is likely that individuals would use information provided from the social environment 
to inform their valuations. Social information might be employed via heuristics (e.g., broadly 
applying strategies such as “copy-the-majority”), or via a more thorough consideration of the 
social context (e.g., considering the type of information, attributes of the source providing the 
information, etc.). The possibility that children use social information to inform their developing 
preferences will be considered in detail in the following section.   
Social Influences on Children’s Preferences 
The motivation to attend to and learn from the social world might be unique to humans 
and confer significant adaptive advantages. Learning from others’ preferences might be one such 
adaptive strategy, as children often have to make critical decisions with limited information. 
Preference expression, via such modes as choice behavior and explicitly stating likes or dislikes, 
is common behavior that children frequently observe others’ performing, and could thus be used 
to acquire information. This information could be specific to others’ idiosyncratic likes and 
dislikes, but it could also convey information about the generally agreed upon value of the 
options. If so, children might incorporate information gleaned from observing others’ 
preferences into their own valuation of those options. 
There are several requisite skills children must possess to acquire value information via 
observation of other’s preferences. First, children must be motivated to seek out and attend to 
information from the social world. Without motivation to learn from the social world, there is no 




Second, children must accurately understand others’ choices or evaluations (e.g., stating that they 
like an option) to reflect their underlying preferences. They need to understand and recognize 
preferences as such to infer that someone is expressing reliable and meaningful information, 
rather than exhibiting random or unintentional behavior.  
 Young children are highly motivated to attend to the behaviors and actions of others (e.g., 
Herrmann, Hernandez-Lloreda, Call, Hare, & Tomasello, 2010). Sensitivity to communicative 
cues, and motivation to learn from others, are hallmarks of human cognition (Csibra & Gergely, 
2009; Herrmann et al.). Numerous studies have demonstrated the ease with which children use 
social cues to learn words (e.g., Baldwin et al., 1996), determine which objects in their 
environment to explore (e.g., Mumme, Fernald, & Herrera, 1996), and choose who to interact 
with (e.g., Feinman & Lewis, 1983). These social cues generally consist of eye gaze, pointing, 
and emotional utterances. Importantly, young children initiate these social exchanges 
spontaneously and across a myriad of contexts, which is indicative of their motivation to learn 
from the world around them. Tomasello and colleagues (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & 
Moll, 2005) have even argued that this motivation to attend to, share with, and understand the 
intentions of others comprise an essential component of children’s social reasoning and learning. 
A multitude of findings in the extant literature highlight young children’s sensitivity to 
preferences. Eighteen-month-old infants understand that other’s preferences are subjective and 
can differ from their own (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). Nineteen-month-old infants understand 
that preferences differ across individuals, expecting that individuals should use the same names 
for things but do not necessarily share the same preference for those things (Graham, Stock, & 
Henderson, 2006). Toddlers also use adults’ non-random sampling (i.e., intentional choice) 




preference is different from the toddlers’ own preference (Ma & Xu, 2011). Further, 2-year-old 
children recognize when others share their preferences (Fawcett & Markson, 2010a), and 3-year-
old children prefer to play with children who share their preferences (Fawcett & Markson, 
2010b). Three-year-old children also choose toys and activities that were preferred by other 
children over adults, and by individuals of the same gender as themselves (Shutts, Banaji, & 
Spelke, 2009). In addition, Hennefield and Markson (in press) demonstrated that 4-year-old 
children were influenced by an adults’ preference behavior only when given clear evidence that 
the adult made an informed decision, rather than a blind choice between two options. Together, 
these studies demonstrate that young children understand that others’ can hold a preference that 
is different from their own, and can use statistical information and choice behavior to infer 
others’ preferences.  
There is also recent evidence to suggest children can incorporate information obtained via 
others preferences into their own object choices. In one study, 18-month-old infants chose to 
play with the same objects for which adults had demonstrated a preference (Fawcett & Markson, 
2009). Another study found that when 4-year-old children observed an adult choose between two 
objects, children attended to the object that was not chosen, and avoided selecting that object for 
themselves. This suggests children devalue options others do not select (Hennefield & Markson, 
in press). Together, these findings provide initial support for the hypothesis that children use 
other’s preferences to inform their option valuations.  
If preferences convey value information, important questions arise concerning the nature 
of that information. The present work will focus on the contrasts between options that have been 
liked relative to another option, disliked relative to another option, and neutral – i.e., no 




plausible that children think about liking in a positive manner, and disliking in a negative 
manner, and might consider these two types of information to be substantially different. There is 
considerable evidence that adults use positive and negative information in different ways to 
reason about the world. In particular, this difference appears to manifest in a negativity bias in 
which negative information is learned and used to a greater degree than positive information. 
More recent research has extended these broad findings to children, with a majority of research 
focusing on a negativity bias in the context of social referencing (see Vaish, Grossmann, & 
Woodward, 2008, for a review). For example, Mumme et al. (1996) had mothers provide infants 
with positive (happy), neutral, or negative (fearful) emotional information about ambiguous toys. 
Infants were subsequently less likely to explore toys their mother was fearful toward than toys 
she was happy or neutral toward. Because there was no difference in infants’ explorations of the 
happy and neutral toys, that suggests that negative information was treated differently from the 
other information.  
 It is important to consider the potential impact of a negativity bias on option valuation, 
because it might be the case that children attend to or incorporate information differently 
depending on the valence of that information. There are clear evolutionary advantages for a bias 
to avoid options that others have shown fear or disgust toward, as people tend to show those 
negative expressions towards things that are potentially harmful or lethal. In contrast, because 
preferences are subjective, they might not invoke the same vigilance and avoidance reactions that 
typically characterize the negativity bias. Thus, children might devalue options others disliked 
and increase their valuation for options others liked if they consider others’ subjective 
assessments of the options to be accurate and reliable indicators of the valuation of the options. 




information about options and might guide children’s own valuations.  
In one of the only studies to directly examine children’s preexisting preferences on their 
valuations, Blake and Rand (2010) investigated 3- to 6-year old children’s distribution patterns 
for resources of high and low value to the child. Using a Dictator Game (DG) paradigm, children 
identified their favorite and least-favorite stickers from a set of four stickers, and then were given 
either 10 of their favorite or 10 of their least-favorite stickers to distribute between themselves 
and another child. Children gave fewer of their favorite stickers to the other child (compared to 
their least-favorite stickers), suggesting they assigned a higher value to their favorites stickers, 
and found giving them away to be more costly. In contrast, children shared significantly more of 
their least-favorite stickers, suggesting a willingness to share provided the cost was not too high.  
The findings by Blake and Rand (2010) offer support for the current hypothesis that 
children use resource value to differentially distribute options. However, whereas Blake and 
Rand found no age differences in the pattern of distribution among those children who 
distributed at least one sticker, less than 50% of the 3-year-old children they tested distributed at 
least one sticker across all of their tasks. In contrast, more than 75% of the 6-year-old children 
they tested distributed at least one sticker. Thus, whereas the DG might be a feasible resource 
distribution method to use with older children, the lack of variability in younger children’s 
responses makes it problematic to use this task with that age population. Further, in the DG 
children have to contend with competing desires to keep resources for themselves and behave 
prosocially by giving resources to the recipient. Whereas these competing demands are a key 
function of the DG as a method of assessing fairness and prosocial behavior, they are not 
necessary to assess value discrimination. Indeed, these demands might serve to add substantial 




as social norms about sharing and whether the child believes there is the potential for future 
reciprocity might also factor into children’s decisions about how many resources to distribute in 
the DG.  
One goal of the present research was to develop a method for assessing value 
discrimination that minimizes the aforementioned task demands and is appropriate to use with 3-
year-old children. To accomplish this, two resource distribution tasks were adapted from the 
fairness and prosociality literature (e.g., Baumard et al., 2012; Sloane et al., 2012; Olson & 
Spelke, 2008). In these tasks, children distribute two resources between two agents. These tasks 
are based on the assumption that children use resource value to reward prosocial agents and/or 
punish non-prosocial agents. In each task, one agent behaves in a prosocial manner (e.g., gives a 
gift, cleans up blocks), and is thus potentially deserving of a higher-valued reward. Importantly, 
this method eliminates children’s own acquisition of the resources from their decision-making 
processes. Further, as children must share one resource with each agent, they do not have to 
decide whether or how much to share; thus their decision is simplified to deciding which 
resource to give to which agent. Study 1 directly tests the assumption that children distribute 
(ostensibly) higher-valued resources to prosocial agents by investigating how 3-year-old children 
distribute two stickers – their a priori favorite and least-favorite stickers – between a prosocial 
and non-prosocial agent. Study 2 utilizes the same resource distribution methodology from Study 
1 to test whether children differentially distribute, and thus potentially differentially value, 
stickers they have observed other children like and dislike. Study 3 takes a direct approach, with 
children explicitly asked to identify which resource they liked best, and which they thought 
another child would like best. This direct methodology was designed to complement the indirect 





 Study 1 investigated whether preschoolers assign relative and stable values to objects for 
which they have a priori preferences, and, if so, whether they are able to demonstrate those 
consistent valuations in multiple contexts. Specifically, we tested whether children would 
distribute objects of higher value to agents who acted prosocially and were thus more deserving 
of greater reward. Two independent tasks were developed to test whether 3-year-old children 
would differentially distribute their favorite of two stickers to: (1) Reciprocity Task – a child 
who had given the participant a gift, versus a child who did not give them a gift; (2) Merit Task – 
a child-like puppet who cleaned up all the toys, versus one who did not clean up any toys. 
Children prefer to share resources with individuals who have previously shared with them (Olson 
& Spelke, 2008), and expect individuals who worked harder to receive more resources than those 
who worked less (Baumard et al., 2012; Sloane et al., 2012). Thus, if children assign differential 
value to the stickers, it was expected that children would distribute their favorite (ostensibly 
higher-valued) sticker to the prosocial agent in both tasks. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four 3-year-old children (M = 3;8, Range = 3;0–3;11, 9 girls) 
participated in a single testing session. One child was replaced for failing to complete the 
Reciprocity Task. Children were recruited from a database of families who had expressed 
interest in participating in developmental research, and were tested in a university laboratory. 
The majority of children were white and from middle-class backgrounds. 
Materials. An initial sticker array consisted of six stickers that were roughly the same 
size but differed on a variety of characteristics (see Figure 3.1). Some stickers were sparkly or 




some were plain and common (e.g., a brown chair). This variety of stickers was chosen to appeal 
to a range of children’s tastes, and also to provide salient properties for children to consider 
when assessing the stickers.      
 
Figure 3.1. The array from which children selected their favorite and least-favorite stickers. The stickers, 
from left to right, depicted a basketball, butterfly, cactus, teapot, dinosaur, and chair. 
 
Reciprocity Task: Cardboard cubes were stacked together to form six cubbies. Each 
cubby contained a nametag and several identical small toys. The names on the top two cubbies 
were changed throughout the study to match the gender of the participant (girl names: 
Holly/Jane; boy names: Brian/Kyle). A gift box, tied with a ribbon and bow to look like a 
prototypical present, was placed in one of the top two cubbies (see Figure 3.2). A small chunky 
crayon was inside the gift box, and made a rattling noise when the box was shaken. The location 
of the gift box was counterbalanced across participants. Stickers were presented in bags to allow 
each child the opportunity to choose which sticker to distribute first.  
Merit Task: Materials included a puppet-show stage, four puppets (two girl-puppets and 
two boy-puppets), 13 colorful blocks, and a clear plastic box to contain the blocks. Puppet 
gender was matched to the gender of the participant, thus each child only saw one pair of 
puppets. One puppet of each gender was blonde with blue eyes and wore a purple shirt; the other 
had black hair, brown eyes, and wore a light blue shirt (see Figure 3.3). The different hair, eyes, 









Design & Procedure. To begin the sticker assessment, the experimenter held up a small 
bag that contained the stickers, peered inside, and told the child that some of the stickers were 
really cool and fun and some were boring and not as nice. Then she dumped the stickers out of 
the bag, turned them all face up, asked, “Which sticker do you like the best?” and encouraged the 
child to select one. This sticker was set aside and became the “liked” sticker for all subsequent 
tasks in Study 1. Then the experimenter asked, “Which sticker do you like the least / not as much 
as the others?” and encouraged the child to select one. This sticker became the “disliked” sticker 
for the remaining tasks. After selecting the liked and disliked stickers, the experimenter placed 
those two stickers in front of the child and asked them to again identify their favorite and least-
favorite stickers. All children’s responses were consistent with their initial preferences.  
Figure 3.2. A depiction of the cubbies 
used in the Reciprocity Task. The gift 
was always placed in one of the top 
two cubbies, and contrasted with the 
other top cubby that belonged to a 
child who did not leave a gift. 
Figure 3.3. A depiction of the puppets and set-up 
used in the Merit Task. One puppet always cleaned 
up all of the blocks by putting them into the box; the 





Reciprocity Task: The child stood on a marker 2’ in front of the cubbies. The 
experimenter stood to the left of the cubbies and told the child that, “These cubbies belong to 
kids that played here yesterday. This cubby is Jane’s [points to cubby with gift] and this cubby is 
Holly’s [points to empty cubby]. We told Jane and Holly that you were coming to play today and 
Jane left you a present! She left this gift for you [picks up box, shakes it, and shows it to child]. 
We’re playing our game now, but when we’re done you can open it up and see what Jane gave 
you [puts gift out of child’s sight, and stands directly behind the child]. Here are two stickers 
[hands participant a bag containing their most and least-favorite stickers]. You can give one 
sticker to Jane [points to Jane’s cubby] and one sticker to Holly [points to Holly’s cubby], and 
you get to pick who gets each sticker. You can put their stickers in their cubbies. Go ahead.” If 
the child hesitated, the experimenter reminded the child to put one sticker in each top cubby. 
Responses were coded for which cubby the child placed each sticker in.     
Merit Task: The child was seated in front of a puppet-show stage. In the middle of the 
stage was a clear plastic box, surrounded by colorful blocks. The two puppets were seated behind 
the blocks. The child was told that, “these boys/girls were playing with these blocks and now it is 
time for them to clean up and put all the blocks back in the box”. Then one of the puppets (the 
helper) proceeded to put all of the blocks in the box while the other puppet occasionally picked 
up a block, played with it, and placed it back down on the table. This puppet never put any 
blocks in the box. Which puppet performed each role, and the side (left/right) where each role 
was performed, was counterbalanced. There were 13 blocks, and the puppet show lasted 
approximately 2 minutes and 30 seconds. After the helper put the final block in the box, the 
experimenter took the box away and said, “All the blocks are cleaned up. Now you have a 




sticker.” Then the experimenter handed the child the bag containing their favorite and least-
favorite stickers. The puppets remained stationary until both stickers were distributed. Responses 
were coded for which sticker children handed (or placed in front of) each puppet.   
 Memory Verification: After each child completed the Reciprocity Task, the experimenter 
asked, “Do you remember who left you this gift? Can you point to the cubby it was in?” After 
the Merit Task, the experimenter asked, “Do you remember which puppet cleaned up all the 
blocks?” These questions were asked to verify that children, in general, comprehended and 
remembered the manipulation. Children responded correctly on 94% of the trials, indicating a 
high level of understanding and memory for the manipulations.    
Preference Verification: After both tasks were completed, the experimenter placed the 
liked and disliked stickers in front of the child and asked, “Which sticker is your favorite?”. This 
question was used to verify that the child’s preference did not shift over the course of the study.  
Results and Discussion 
To test whether children systematically distributed their favorite sticker to the prosocial 
agents, children’s responses were coded for whether they distributed their favorite (1) or least-
favorite (0) sticker the prosocial agent in each task. Overall, children gave their favorite sticker 
to the prosocial agent significantly more often than would be expected by chance (M = 1.42, SD 
= .65), t(1, 23) = 3.122, p = .005 (see Figure 3.4). There were no differences in distribution 
patterns with regard to task or gender.  
In the Reciprocity Task, 17 of 24 children gave their favorite sticker to the agent who left 
them the gift, binomial probability, p = .032. In the Merit Task, 17 of 24 children gave their 
favorite sticker to the agent who cleaned up all the blocks, binomial probability, p = .032. Across 




agent in both tasks, 10 children gave their favorite sticker to the prosocial agent in one task, and 
2 children never gave their favorite sticker to the prosocial agent. These frequencies are 
significantly different, χ2 (2, N = 24) = 7, p = .03.  
 
  
Figure 3.4. In Study 1, children gave their favorite sticker to the prosocial agent more often than would be 
expected by chance in both the Reciprocity and Merit Tasks.  
 
Two children did not answer the memory question correctly for the Reciprocity question, 
and one child did not answer the memory question correctly for the Merit question. The purpose 
of the memory questions was to verify that, in general, children understood and remembered the 
experimental manipulations. Thus, after verifying that their exclusion did not significantly alter 
the findings, the children who responded incorrectly were conservatively included in the 




during the final preference verification. It is less clear how to handle this child’s data, as it is 
possible that the child’s preferences shifted over the course of the study. However, it is equally 
possible that they were simply inattentive by the time the question was asked at the conclusion of 
the study. As no other child changed their mind, it does not appear that changing a preference is 
something that commonly happens over the course of this study. Thus, after verifying that this 
child’s exclusion did not significantly alter the findings, and this child was included in the 
analyses. 
The goal of Study 1 was to determine whether children assign consistent values to 
options for which they have a priori preferences. The findings support this hypothesis. Children 
gave their favorite stickers to the prosocial agents more often than would be expected by chance, 
indicating they used their a priori preferences, or valuations, to guide their distribution choices. 
Further, the lack of a difference between performance on the Reciprocity and Merit Tasks 
suggests that children exhibit these valuations across multiple contexts and situations. 
Importantly, in these tasks, the basic heuristics discussed earlier were not available (e.g., “more 
is more” could not be used because quantity was held constant). This study corroborates Blake 
and Rand’s (2010) finding that children’s a priori preferences influence their option valuations. 
Study 2 adapts this methodology to test whether social influences – specifically other children’s 
preferences – influence children’s option valuation in situations in which they do not hold an a 
priori preference for one of the options.  
Study 2 
Study 2 used the value discrimination tasks developed for Study 1 to investigate whether 
children incorporate information gleaned from observing others’ preferences into their valuation 




preference for one of two stickers. These peer actors sequentially demonstrated the same 
preferences; each liked one specific sticker (liked sticker) and disliked the other (disliked 
sticker). After viewing the video, each child was given two stickers to distribute: either the liked 
sticker and a neutral sticker (Positive Condition) or the disliked sticker and neutral sticker 
(Negative Condition) in the Reciprocity and Merit Tasks. If children incorporate preference 
information into their object valuations, it was predicted that they would give the liked sticker 
(over the neutral sticker) to the prosocial agents in the Positive Condition, and would give the 
neutral sticker (over the disliked sticker) to the prosocial agents in the Negative Condition.  
Methods 
Participants. Forty-eight 3-year-old children (M = 3;5, Range = 3;1–3;11, 24 girls) 
participated in a single testing session. Four children were replaced for parental interference (1), 
failure to complete the reciprocity task (1), and failure to pass the video familiarization by 
matching the stickers from the video to physical copies of the stickers (2). Children were 
recruited from the same population as Study 1, but had not participated in Study 1. 
Materials. Three stickers were used. These stickers were 3.8cm diameter circles and 
consisted of a blue design on a white background. The designs – a star, swirl, and snowflake 
pattern – were chosen to be equally interesting to children, yet distinct (see Figure 3.5). Whether 
the swirl or snowflake was the liked or disliked sticker was counterbalanced; the star was always 
the neutral sticker.   
      




Social Influence Manipulation (SIM): Short video clips (each 11.6 s) in which four actors 
demonstrated that they liked one sticker and disliked another sticker. The third sticker – the 
neutral sticker – did not appear in the video. The actors were two boys and two girls of roughly 
the same age as the participants. Each actor picked up each sticker in turn and examined it while 
expressing their preference. They demonstrated liking by saying in an excited tone, “Oh, cool, I 
really like this one!” and disliking by saying in a negative tone, “Oh, no, I don’t like this one”. 
The “stickers” in the actors’ hands were actually blank squares of paper, but children could not 
tell this from watching the video. As the actor was expressing their first preference, a picture of 
the sticker they were “looking at” appeared onscreen, to the right of the actor, and remained 
visible for 4 seconds while they spoke. Then that picture disappeared, a picture of the second 
sticker appeared onscreen to the left of the actor, and again remained visible for 4 seconds while 
they expressed the complementary preference. Thus, the same preference expressions (i.e., each 
instance of a preference being expressed) were counterbalanced to pair with each specific sticker, 
and all children viewed all of the same preference expressions. This ensured that the actors own 
preferences could not influence their preference expression, and this method had the added 
benefit of equating the length of time allotted to each preference expression in the video. The 
order the actors appeared on screen was also counterbalanced with the constraint that two actors 
of the same gender did not appear in succession.  
Materials for the Reciprocity and Merit Tasks were the same as those from Study 1. 
Design & Procedure. Children were randomly assigned to either the Positive or 
Negative Condition. The procedure largely followed that of Study 1, with the exception that the 
SIM replaced children’s own sticker assessment. Each child watched the SIM on a laptop 




two physical stickers in front of the child. Children in the Positive Condition were presented with 
the liked sticker (from the video) and the neutral sticker (not in the video) and were asked which 
sticker the actor liked. Children in the Negative Condition were presented with the disliked 
sticker and the neutral sticker and were asked which sticker the actor did not like. If a child 
responded incorrectly, the experiment gently corrected them by saying, “Actually, they said they 
liked/did not like this one”, while pointing to the appropriate sticker.  
This type of adult-guided interaction for information presented on video has been shown 
to facilitate children’s abilities to learn via video (Strouse, O'Doherty, & Troseth, 2013). There is 
ample evidence that toddlers have more difficulty learning information when it is presented via 
video than when that same information is presented live (e.g.,Troseth, Saylor, & Archer, 2006), 
and by two and a half years of age that difference is lessened, but does not entirely disappear 
(Troseth & DeLoache, 1998). However, recent research provides evidence that preschool 
children learn more efficiently from video when they watch with their parents and their parents 
periodically pause, ask questions, and have children describe parts of the video (Strouse et al.). 
Following the experimenter-guided familiarization described above, only two children failed to 
correctly identify the correct sticker after all four video clips, and were subsequently excluded 
from analyses and replaced. The remaining children all correctly answered the last two 
questions, with the majority responding correctly throughout the familiarization. 
 After watching the SIM, each child completed the Reciprocity and Merit Tasks following 
the procedure outlined in Study 1. Children in the Positive Condition distributed the liked and 
neutral stickers, whereas those in the Negative Condition distributed the disliked and neutral 





Results & Discussion 
 To test whether children systematically distributed the two stickers as a function of the 
information presented in the SIM, we coded which stickers children gave to the prosocial agents. 
In the Positive Condition (N = 24), we coded whether children gave the liked (1) or the neutral 
(0) sticker to the prosocial agents across the two tasks. In the Negative Condition (N = 24), we 
coded whether children gave the disliked (1) or the neutral (0) sticker to the prosocial agents 
across the two tasks. If children incorporated the preferences of their peers into their object 
valuations, then in the Positive Condition children should give more valenced (liked) than neutral 
stickers to the prosocial agents. In contrast, in the Negative Condition, children should give 
fewer valenced (disliked) than neutral stickers to the prosocial agents. A 2 (Task: 
Reciprocity/Merit) x 2 (Condition: Positive/Negative) x 2 (Gender: Girls/Boys) Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) was conducted with task as the within-subjects factor and condition and 
gender as between-subjects factors. The ANOVA revealed no differences between the two tasks, 
nor an interaction between task and condition; thus, the tasks were collapsed together for the 
remainder of the analyses. Tests of between-subjects effects revealed a main effect of condition, 
such that children in the Positive Condition gave significantly more valenced stickers to the 
prosocial agent (M = 1.17, SD = .76) than children in the Negative Condition (M = .37, SD = 
.57), F(1, 44) = 21.011, p < .001. There was also a significant interaction between condition and 
gender, F(1, 44) = 13.095, p = .001. The nature of this interaction, and differences between the 
Positive and Negative Condition, are explored in the following analyses.  
 In the Positive Condition, an initial analysis indicated that children did not distribute the 
stickers differentially between the two agents, t(1, 23) = 1.072 p = .295. However, a one-way 




liked stickers to the prosocial agents than boys (M = .75, SD = .75), F(2, 22) = 10, p = .005. This 
finding suggests that girls, but not boys, were sensitive to the information conveyed via their 
peers’ expressions of liking, and used that information to systematically distribute the liked 
sticker to the more deserving agents.  
 In the Negative Condition, children gave the disliked sticker to the prosocial agents 
significantly less often than would be expected by chance, t(1, 23) = 5.32, p < .001. A one-way 
ANOVA revealed a marginal effect of gender such that girls (M = .17, SD = .39) distributed 
marginally fewer disliked stickers to the prosocial agents than boys (M = .58, SD = .67), F(2.22) 
= 3.48, p = .075 (see Figure 3.6). To further clarify the nature of children’s distribution patterns 
in the Negative Condition, we calculated that 16 children never gave the disliked sticker to a 
prosocial agent, 7 children gave the disliked sticker to a prosocial agent in one task, and 1 child 
gave the disliked sticker to the prosocial agents in both tasks. These frequencies were 
significantly different, χ2 (2, N = 24) = 14.25, p < .001. Together, these findings suggest that 
both girls and boys were sensitive to the negative information conveyed via their peers’ 
expressions of dislike, and used that information to systematically avoid distributing the disliked 
sticker to the more deserving agents, instead giving them the neutral sticker. Further, girls used 
this information to a marginally greater extent than did boys.      
 For the memory verification questions, children responded correctly on 96% of the trials, 
indicating a high level of understanding and memory for the manipulations. In the Positive 
Condition, two children did not correctly answer the Reciprocity verification question; all 
children correctly answered the Merit verification question. In the Negative Condition, one child 
did not correctly answer the Reciprocity verification question, and one child did not correctly 




alter the findings, these children were conservatively included in the analyses. 
  
Figure 3.6. In the Positive Condition girls gave the liked sticker to the prosocial agents more often than 
would be expected by chance. In the Negative Condition both girls and boys gave the disliked sticker to 
the prosocial agent significantly less than would be expected by chance.  
  
 After completing the resource distribution tasks, all children were shown the liked and 
disliked stickers and asked to identify their favorite. In the Positive Condition, 13 children chose 
the liked sticker as their favorite sticker, and 11 children chose the neutral sticker as their 
favorite. This distribution is not significantly different from chance, binomial probability p = 
.419, and there were no gender differences. In the Negative Condition, 6 children chose the 




This distribution is significantly different from chance, binomial probability p = .011, and again 
there were no gender differences. This provides additional evidence that children’s valuations of 
the stickers were influenced largely by their peers dislikes.   
 Together, these findings suggest that 3-year-old children used information provided by 
their peers, presented via video, to inform their valuations of options. Children devalued the 
stickers their peers disliked, as demonstrated by their reluctance to give those stickers to the 
prosocial agents. Children’s devaluation of the disliked stickers was also evidenced in their 
choice of the neutral sticker over the disliked sticker as their own favorite. However, only girls 
increased their valuation of the liked stickers relative to the neutral stickers, and this valuation 
was only evidenced in the resource distribution tasks. This gender difference was not predicted, 
but accords with gender differences found in some other resource distribution tasks (e.g., Blake 
& Rand, 2010; Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011).  
 There are four plausible explanations for this gender effect. The first is that girls are more 
sensitive to the social information – other children’s preferences – than boys. Thus, either girls 
remembered the information from the video better, or utilized it more readily, in the distribution 
tasks. The second explanation is that both boys and girls are equally sensitive to the social 
information, but girls were more motivated than boys to provide the prosocial agent with the 
higher-valued option. The third explanation is that girls are more motivated to produce socially 
desirable responses than boys. The fourth explanation is that the gender of the agents drove the 
gender effect, rather than the gender of the participants. Each of these possibilities will be 
considered more in depth in the general discussion.   
   The differences between the Positive and Negative Conditions also suggest that boys, 




information. If so, this would provide evidence that the negativity bias extends beyond social-
emotional (e.g., Mumme et al., 1996) and highly arousing threatening stimuli (e.g., LoBue, 
2014), to subjective preference information. Children’s systematic reluctance to choose the 
disliked sticker as their favorite, but willingness to choose equally between the liked and neutral 
stickers, provides additional support for the hypothesis that negative information plays a 
privileged role in influencing children’s behavior. However, in Study 2, children were always 
asked to choose their own favorite sticker after completing the two resource distribution tasks. 
This was done to prevent their explicit choice from potentially influencing their subsequent 
resource distribution, however, it is also possible that how children distributed the resources 
influenced their selection of their favorite sticker. Thus, Study 3 was designed to assess 
children’s own preferences directly after viewing the SIM. Further, children were also directly 
asked which sticker they thought another child would like best, as a contrast to the implicit 
measure used in Study 2.   
Study 3  
 In Study 3 children viewed the same SIM videos from Study 2, and were shown all three 
stickers (liked, neutral and disliked) during the experimenter-guided familiarization. Then 
children were directly asked, in counterbalanced order, which sticker they liked best (Self 
Question), and which sticker they thought another child would like best (Other Question). In 
Study 2, children were deliberately not asked to express a preference for one of the stickers until 
after the resource distribution tasks were completed. This was done to avoid facilitating or 
strengthening children’s own preferences for one of the options through their choice behavior. 
However, as the preference question was asked last in Study 2, it is unclear whether children’s 




tasks. Thus, Study 3 provides a straightforward test of whether children’s own choices were 
influenced by the SIM. Children were also directly asked which sticker another gender-matched 
child would like as an additional measure of social influence. Further, in Study 3 children were 
presented with all three stickers to choose between for each question.  
 Participants. Twenty-four 3-year-old children (M = 3;4, Range = 3;1–4;0, 13 girls) 
participated in a single testing session. One child was replaced for failure to pass the video 
familiarization by matching the stickers from the video to physical copies of the stickers. 
Children were recruited from the same population as Studies 1 and 2, but had not participated in 
either of those studies. 
 Materials. The same three stickers and SIM from Study 2 were used, however which 
specific sticker was the liked, disliked, and neutral sticker was fully counterbalanced. Two 
photographs, one of a preschool-aged boy and one of a preschool-aged girl, were used for the 
Other Question.   
 Design & Procedure. Each child watched the SIM on a laptop computer. To ensure 
understanding, after the first video clip the experimenter showed each child two physical 
stickers, the liked and disliked stickers from the video, and asked them which sticker the actor 
liked and did not like (order randomized). After the remaining three video clips, the experimenter 
presented each child with all three stickers, and asked which sticker the actor liked, disliked, and 
which was not in the video (order randomized). As in Study 2, if the child responded incorrectly 
the experimenter gently corrected them. One child failed to correctly identify the correct sticker 
after all four video clips and was subsequently excluded from analyses and replaced. 
 After the SIM, the experimenter asked both the Self and Other Questions (order 




and asking, “Now you tell me, which do you like the best”. She asked the Other Question by 
showing a gender-matched child on the laptop, and explaining that this child had never seen 
these stickers before. Then she placed all three stickers in front of the child and asked, “Now you 
tell me, which do you think he/she would like best?” 
Results & Discussion 
To test whether children chose the liked stickers (or avoided the disliked stickers) for 
themselves and a new child, children’s responses were coded for which sticker they first chose 
(via pointing or picking up) after being asked each question. For the Self Question, of the 24 
children, 13 children chose the liked sticker, 8 chose the neutral sticker, and 3 chose the disliked 
sticker. These frequencies are significantly different, χ2 (2, N = 24) = 6.25, p = .044. Planned 
comparisons revealed that children selected the liked sticker more frequently than the disliked 
sticker, binomial probability, p = .011. However, there were no overall difference between 
children’s selection of the liked and neutral stickers, or the neutral and disliked stickers. These 
findings suggest that children systematically avoided selecting the disliked sticker for 
themselves, yet considered both the liked and the neutral sticker to be equally acceptable 
candidates to select, and chose equally between them.  
For the Other Question, of the same 24 children, 17 children chose the liked sticker as the 
other child’s favorite, 6 chose the neutral sticker, and 1 chose the disliked sticker. These 
frequencies are significantly different, χ2 (2, N = 24) = 16.75, p < .001. Planned comparisons 
revealed that children selected the liked sticker more frequently than the disliked sticker, 
binomial probability, p < .001, and the neutral sticker marginally more frequently than the 
disliked sticker, binomial probability p = .062. Children also selected the liked sticker more 




suggest that children systematically chose the liked sticker for the other child, and avoided 
selecting the disliked sticker. However, even though children selected the liked sticker more than 
the neutral sticker, they also selected the neutral sticker marginally more than the disliked 
sticker. Thus, not all children simply matched the preferences expressed in the video to the new 
child’s preferences.    
 
 
Figure 3.7. This figure depicts the frequencies of children choosing the liked, neutral, or disliked sticker for 
themselves (Self Question) and a new child (Other Question).  
 
The overall pattern of children’s responses did not significantly differ across the two 
questions, chi square χ2 (2, N = 24) = 3.06, p = .216. However, 10 of the 24 children gave a 
different response to each question, which suggests that children did not consider the questions 
to be the same and/or did not simply repeat their first response for the second question. 
Importantly, there were no effects of question order on responses, nor were there any effects of 
gender. However, because all children overwhelmingly chose the liked or neutral stickers, those 
strong findings could be masking more subtle effects of gender. Taken together, the findings of 




to guide their valuations of the stickers. The results also provide support for the claim that 
negative information plays a privileged role in children’s choice behavior.   
General Discussion 
 The present findings demonstrate that 3-year-old children assign relative and stable 
values to two discrete options, and use this value to systematically reward prosocial and/or 
punish non-prosocial agents. Further, children appear to incorporate information gleaned from 
observing others’ preference into their own valuations of options. After viewing four peers 
express consistent preferences for one option over another, children appear to devalue the option 
their peers disliked, as they systematically avoided selecting it for a prosocial agent, a new child, 
and themselves. This indicates that children might utilize negative preference information 
(disliking) in a substantially different way from positive preference information (liking), such as 
privileging the role of negative information. However, in the resource distribution tasks, girls 
appeared to also increase their value of the option their peers liked, as they gave more liked than 
neutral stickers to the prosocial agents. This potentially indicates that girls are more influenced 
by the social information conveyed by their peers, more motivated to differentially distribute the 
options, and/or more sensitive to the social context of the experiment. Finally, boys and girls 
chose equally between the liked and neutral options as their own favorites, while avoiding the 
disliked options. This finding provides additional evidence that children incorporated their peers’ 
dislikes into their valuations to a greater degree than their peers’ likes. The potential role of a 
negativity bias, explanations for the gender difference, and the relationship between selecting 
options for others versus oneself will be considered in detail.  
 In Study 1, children systematically distributed their favorite (ostensibly higher-valued) 




agents. However, because children only had two stickers and two choices of agents, it is not 
possible to determine whether children chose to distribute the higher-valued sticker to the 
prosocial agent (thus, by default distributing the lower-valued sticker to the non-prosocial agent), 
the lower-valued sticker to the non-prosocial agent (thus, by default distributing the higher-
valued sticker to the prosocial agent), or a combination of both. However, Studies 2 and 3 
included a third, non-valenced (i.e., neutral), option in an attempt to disentangle the relative 
influence of positively and negatively valenced preference information on children’s valuations.  
 In Study 2, in the Negative Condition both boys and girls distributed more neutral 
stickers to the prosocial agents (and, thus, more disliked stickers to the non-prosocial agents). In 
the Positive Condition boys did not distribute more liked stickers to the prosocial agents than 
neutral stickers. This suggests that boys devalued the disliked sticker relative to the neutral 
sticker more than they increased their valuation of the liked sticker relative to the neutral sticker. 
In Study 3, both boys and girls selected the disliked sticker significantly less frequently than 
either the liked or neutral sticker for both a new child and themselves. One explanation for this 
pattern of findings is that stickers – including the neutral sticker – are already highly valued by 
children. Indeed, stickers were intentionally chosen for the stimuli because most children find 
them desirable. Arguably, most options that individuals have to choose between have some 
value, and to that end using stickers contributes to the ecological validity of this research. Thus, 
it might not be the case that children differentially incorporated the liked and disliked 
information into their valuations, but rather that the value added by their peers’ expression of 
liking did not (or could not) substantially increase the value of that option over that of the neutral 
option.   




information in their valuations. It has been posited that a negativity bias, characterized by 
attending to, remembering, and learning from negative information to a greater degree than other 
information, is present early in development and guides children’s behavior and learning (see 
Vaish et al., 2008, for a review). However, the types of negative information typically cited in 
discussions of the negativity bias are fear (e.g., Hertenstein & Campos, 2001; Mumme et al., 
1996; Mumme & Fernald, 2003) and disgust (e.g., Carver & Vaccaro, 2007; Hornik, 
Risenhoover, & Gunnar, 1987; Moses, Baldwin, Rosicky, & Tidball, 2001). This fits with an 
evolutionary account, as individuals typically express fear and disgust when there is the potential 
for harm to occur, and the avoidance of harm offers clear adaptive advantages. For example, 
expressing fear could prevent someone from getting too close to the edge of a cliff, and 
expressing disgust could keep them from consuming spoiled food; two universal dangers. 
Preferences, in contrast, are inherently more subjective. As such, options that one individual 
likes might be disliked by another, and vice versa. Thus, it seems unlikely that children would 
explicitly equate an expression of dislike with one of danger. However, it is possible that 
children process both types of negative information similarly, and therefore treat disliked 
information as if it was harmful.  
 Children’s expectations might also drive them to privilege disliked information. People 
are generally positive toward the world around them, and most options – those things they 
interact with in daily life – contain value. Further, when people encounter options they dislike, a 
common course of action is to ignore or avoid them, rather than overtly express dislike. In 
contrast, because individuals often interact with the things they prefer, they have many more 
opportunities to express explicit liking. For example, if someone orders a cone at a local ice 




that is similar to other flavors they know they like. Subsequently, when they remark on their 
choice, their comments are almost always positive; it would be rare to end up with an ice cream 
flavor they did not like. Thus, it is possible that children in the present studies were more 
sensitive to the explicitly disliked information because it was unexpected, and thus weighted it 
more heavily in their option valuations than the liked information. Importantly, these 
explanations for why children prioritized the disliked information are not mutually excusive, and 
might all contribute to the current pattern of results. Further, the differences between liked and 
disliked information do not detract from the more general finding that, at least in some 
circumstances, children are influenced by their peers’ preferences.  
One somewhat unexpected finding was that girls, in the resource distribution tasks (Study 
2), distributed more liked than neutral stickers to the prosocial agents. In contrast, when choosing 
another child’s favorite sticker (Study 3), both girls and boys selected more liked than neutral 
stickers. Together, those findings suggest that both girls and boys learned something about the 
value of the options their peers liked. However, girls incorporated that information into their 
resource distribution whereas boys did not. There are several possible explanations for these 
findings.  
One explanation is that girls are more sensitive to social information than boys, and 
subsequently retain and/or integrate all social information into their behavior to a greater extent 
than boys. This explanation accounts for girls’ use of the liked information throughout all the 
tasks, and boys use of the liked information only in Study 3. In Study 3, there was minimal lag 
time between when children viewed the videos and selected the stickers, and both events 
occurred at the same location, with little change in complexity of the environment. In contrast, in 




separate locations. These changes increased the length of time children needed to retain the 
information in order to utilize it, and the complexity of the environment in which children were 
making their decisions. If boys are less sensitive to social information, and if the liked 
information was less salient than the disliked information, than boys many not have retained or 
considered that information to the same extent as girls. There is some indirect evidence from 
research on autobiographical memory in children that supports this explanation. Specifically, 
when retelling events, young girls talk considerably more about the social context (e.g., other 
people, relationships), and less about themselves, than boys (Buckner & Fivush, 1998; 2000; 
Tougu, Tulviste, & Suits, 2014). Whereas these studies do not disentangle children’s memory for 
the events from their choice of information to retell, they do suggest that girls utilize social 
information to a greater degree than boys when considering past events – and this might extend 
to an increased sensitivity for their peers’ preferences.  
Alternatively, if boys and girls are equivalently sensitive to their peers’ preferences, there 
are three additional explanations that could account for the gender differences observed in the 
present research. Two pertain to the differences between how girls and boys might act in social 
contexts. The first is that girls are more prosocial than boys, and the second is that girls are more 
motivated to produce socially desirable responses. The former hinges on the prosocial element of 
the resource distribution tasks – the act of giving the resources to the agents – that was not 
present when children were asked to select which of two stickers they thought another child 
would like. In such an account, girls are more intrinsically motivated than boys to behave in a 
helpful or prosocial manner, and this extends to differentially distributing the liked and neutral 
resources (presumably to reward the prosocial agents). In contrast, the latter explanation, social 




account, girls are more extrinsically motivated than boys to provide the response the 
experimenter would find most appropriate or expected, and this extends to giving the liked 
sticker to the prosocial agents.  
There is mixed evidence to support the possibility that girls are more prosocial than boys. 
When gender differences have been observed in behavioral economics tasks, the reliable 
direction of this effect is females opting for more equitable distributions than males (e.g., 
Andreoni & Versterlund, 2001; Gummerum, Keller, Takezawa, & Mata, 2008; Murnigham & 
Saxon, 1998), though many studies do not find any gender differences (e.g., Gummerum, 
Hanoch, Keller, Parsons, Hummel, 2010; Hennefield & Markson, in prep.). In research most 
similar to the present work, Blake and Rand (2010) found that more girls than boys distributed at 
least one sticker in a DG task. However, of those children who distributed at least one sticker, 
there were no gender differences in children’s distribution patterns for their favorite and least-
favorite stickers. Blake and Rand consider this finding as evidence for greater prosocial behavior 
in girls, as distributing any resources in the DG is a departure from a rational utilitarian approach 
to maximizing gains. Similarly, Benozio and Diesendruck (2015) found that girls distributed 
more resources to out-group members than boys, which the researchers characterize as boys’ 
strategic protection of resources for the good of their in-group. However, unlike the DG, the 
present resource distribution tasks were set up in such a way that all children were required to be 
prosocial (i.e., they were required to give one sticker to each of the agents). Further, there were 
no direct costs to children in terms of resource distribution, as children were not permitted to 
keep the any resources for themselves. Thus, from a strategic standpoint, it would seem that all 
children should have factored their peers’ likes into their resource distribution, as the potential 




the potential costs (e.g., cognitive resources to remember/use the liked information). In that light, 
attributing the gender differences found in the present work to increased prosociality in girls is 
not the most parsimonious explanation.    
It is also unlikely that 3-year-old girl’s responses were driven by an extrinsic desire to 
produce socially desirable responses. There is emerging evidence that by 5 years of age children 
begin to strategically manage their reputations. Five-year-old children share slightly more 
resources when they are being watched by a peer than when they are alone (Engelmann et al., 
2012), when the recipient is aware of the quantity of options the child could distribute 
(Leimgruber et al., 2012), and when they are being watched by someone who could reciprocate 
later as well as an ingroup versus an outgroup member (Engelmann et al., 2013). In addition, 4-
year-old children will publically, but not privately, conform to their peers, even when they know 
their peers are wrong (Haun & Tomasello, 2011). Thus, by the late preschool years, children 
appear to begin to manage their reputations. However, none of the aforementioned studies found 
differences in reputation management between girls and boys, nor is there any direct evidence to 
suggest that 3-year-old children engage in reputation management.  
One final possibility is that the gender of the agents drove the gender effect, rather than 
(or in addition to) the gender of the participants. For example, it is possible that participants 
believed that girl-agents, but not boy-agents, would desire the liked stickers over the neutral 
stickers, or that prosocial girl-agents would be more likely than prosocial boy-agents to 
reciprocate in the future. As the gender of the participants was matched to the gender of the 
agents, the present study cannot offer insight into the likelihood of this account. However, there 
is some evidence from the extant literature to support this possibility. In particular, one study 




gender, and this preference was almost entirely driven by girls’ preferences for other girls. In a 
subsequent resource distribution task, the researchers again found effects of gender such that 
girls gave more resources to other girls than boys, but boys did not favor other boys over girls 
(Dunham et al., 2011). Thus, in the present study girls might have been more motivated to 
differentially reward other girls, but might not necessarily show that same distribution pattern if 
they were distributing resources to boys.   
 The mixed findings from the extant literature provide marginal support for each of these 
explanations and raise the possibility that the gender differences observed in Study 3 are not the 
result of single straightforward cause. However, girls’ early understanding of gender norms 
might contribute to an increased sensitivity to social information, and potentially to increased 
prosocial behavior and consideration of the gender of the agents. Attending to others, 
demonstrating sensitivity to their needs, behaving prosocially, and promoting equality over 
conflict, are all more stereotypically associated with females than males. Thus, girls’ behavior 
might be due to their internalization these gender norms, or external pressures to produce 
socially desirable actions. Some ways in which future studies could attempt to resolve these 
questions include uncoupling children’s gender from that of the recipient and directly testing for 
gender differences in children’s processing (e.g., attention, memory, etc.) of social information.   
 One final issue to consider is the relationship between selecting options for others versus 
selecting options for oneself. In Study 2, after completing the resource distribution tasks, 
children selected one of the two stickers as their favorite. In the Positive Condition, an equivalent 
number of children chose the liked and neutral stickers as their favorite. In the Negative 
Condition, a majority of children chose the neutral sticker as their favorite, systematically 




stickers over the disliked stickers, with no differences found between the number of children 
who chose the liked and neutral stickers. In contrast, a majority of children chose the liked 
sticker over the neutral sticker as a new child’s favorite. This finding fits with the account that 
values are computed at the time a choice is made, based on multiple dimensions of those options. 
When determining the preference of a new child, children had limited information to use in their 
valuation. Whereas the available information was not solely limited to their peers’ preferences 
(i.e., children had information about the other child’s gender, appearance, etc.), they arguably 
had little information to use to determine which option that child would find more valuable, and 
thus more heavily weighted the information they did have – their peers’ preferences. In contrast, 
children had substantially more information to factor into their determination of their own 
favorite  (e.g., their own gender, personal shape or color preferences, past experiences with 
similar options, etc.) – and thus their peers’ preferences were weighted less heavily into their 
valuation. Alternative explanations, such as attributing children’s distribution patterns to the 
social dynamics of the experimental context (e.g., social desirability), rather than a change in 
their valuations of the options, cannot be definitively ruled out. However, they are highly 
unlikely given the systematic differences between children’s overall consideration of the liked 
and disliked stickers, differences in responses between choosing stickers for oneself and another 
child, and the corroborative findings between Studies 2 and 3.  
 In the present studies, the information children received about their peers’ preferences 
was consistent across all four peers. This raises two limitations and potential directions for future 
research. The first concerns the consistency of the information. There is substantial evidence that 
young children are able to use statistical information to inform their learning, and this extends to 




Xu, 2011). However, whether children attended to the internal consistency of the preference 
information (i.e., within-individual consistency) or the proportion of individuals who expressed a 
particular preference (i.e., between-individual consistency) is not known. For example, if 
children observed four peers express consistent preferences for liking option-A and disliking 
option-B, and then a fifth peer expressed disliking option-A and liking option-B, would 
observing that fifth person’s preference (i.e., the opposite preference) serve to increase children’s 
valuations of option-B relative to viewing consistent negative information toward option-B? It is 
possible that children equally weight each instance of a peers’ preference expression, and would 
thus marginally increase their valuation for option-B. In contrast, children might consider the 
preferences expressions as one event, adopt the preferences of the majority and disregard the 
minority, and thus not change their valuation of option-B. Furthermore, if a negativity bias is 
driving children’s devaluation of the disliked option, the absolute number of disliked expressions 
might not mater, but the consistency of the information could play a crucial role. If the negativity 
bias serves a fundamental protective function (i.e., to prevent individuals from interacting with 
objects or food that is potentially harmful), then observing even one instance of that disliked 
option being liked might substantially reduce or eliminate the negativity bias. If so, observing 
one peer like option-B might result in children substantially increasing their valuation for option-
B relative to receiving consistent negative information about it. Answering this question is 
important to characterizing the types of information and contexts in which children are 
influenced by their peers’ preferences.   
 Similarly, classic work on social influence and conformity has found a minimum of three 
informants necessary to elicit conformist behavior in adults (e.g., Asch, 1956). Four informants 




view four different peers in order to be influenced by their preferences. One possibility is that, 
because the peers were strangers, children might have attended to the quantity and consistency of 
the preference expressions to a greater degree than they would if the peers were familiar. Future 
studies are needed to clarify the impact of informant attributes on children’s option valuations 
and preferences.  
 One final point pertains to the medium in which children were exposed to their peers’ 
preferences. These studies are the first to demonstrate that, not only are 3-year-old children’s 
valuations are influenced by their peers preferences, but also that they are influenced when those 
preferences are presented via video. Young children often have more difficulty learning 
information from video than when that same information is presented live (e.g., Troseth et al., 
2006; Troseth & DeLoache, 1998). Thus, it is likely that the current findings underestimate the 
extent to which children might incorporate their peers’ preferences into their valuations. In a 
richer and more ecologically valid environment – such as observing a friend express a preference 
– children’s valuations might be influenced by substantially less information.  
 There is a wealth of timely and pertinent information available via the social domain, and 
strategically extracting and utilizing such information could yield adaptive advantages. The 
present research indicates that young children can use social information – specifically, peers’ 
preferences – to inform their relative valuation of options and subsequent preferences. Not only 
do 3-year-old children assign relative and consistent valuations to options for which they have an 
a priori preference, but they can use these valuations to systematically reward a prosocial agent 
and/or punish a non-prosocial agent. Further, after viewing four peers express a consistent 
preference for one option over another, children appear to devalue the option their peers disliked, 




Interestingly, in certain contexts, girls appear to increase their value of the option their peers 
liked, whereas boys do not. This suggests that girls might be more sensitive to social information 
and social context than boys. It is possible that girls attend to and retain information acquired via 
observing their peers’ preferences to a greater extent than boys, and utilize this information in 
relevant social contexts, such as distributing resources to others. Finally, children (boys and 
girls) chose equally between liked and neutral resources as their own favorite, while avoiding 
disliked resources. Taken together, the present findings suggest that children’s object valuations 
are informed by the preferences of their peers. Further, subjective negative information (e.g., 
others’ dislikes) appears to play a privileged role in influencing children’s choice behavior. 
Together, these studies provide new insight into children’s early economic reasoning, and 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
This research had two primary goals: (1) to develop methodology to assess value 
discrimination in young children, and (2) to investigate how young children’s option valuations – 
and subsequent preferences – might be influenced by the preferences of their peers. These goals 
were realized across four empirical studies. The study presented in Chapter 2 used an established 
resource distribution methodology, the Dictator Game (DG), to test whether 4-year-old 
children’s preferences were influenced by the preferences of their peers. Children observed, via 
video, four peers display the same preference for one of two stickers. Each peer expressed liking 
one sticker and disliking the other. Then children completed two rounds the DG; one with each 
sticker type. If their peers’ preferences influenced children’s own preferences, we expected 
children to keep more liked than disliked stickers for themselves. Indeed, more children kept 
more liked than disliked stickers, indicating their distribution patterns were influenced by their 
peers’ preferences. This finding also suggests that children extracted informational content about 
the value of the stickers from their peers and used that to guide their own preferences. To the 
best of my knowledge, this is the first study to provide evidence that 4-year-old children’s 
preferences are influenced by the preferences of their peers. However, these findings also raise 
questions for future research and highlight several limitations of using the DG to assess value 
discrimination in young children. 
The problems with using the DG as a method for testing questions concerning value 
discrimination can be attributed to two factors: too much freedom in how the resources can be 
distributed, and children factoring their own desires for the resources into their decision making 
processes. Whereas these are key functions of the DG as a method of assessing fairness and 




substantial noise when used in that manner. These concerns become further amplified when 
comparing children’s distribution patterns across multiple rounds of the DG. Thus, the two 
subsequent value discrimination tasks developed for the studies presented in Chapter 3 
eliminated these concerns. These new resource distribution tasks were predicated on the 
assumption that children would use the value of a resource as a means of rewarding prosocial 
agents and/or punishing non-prosocial agents. Thus, children learned about the prosociality of 
two agents (one who was prosocial, one who was not prosocial) and then distributed one 
resource to each agent. Once children had selected one resource to distribute to one agent, they 
had no choice but to give the complementary resource to the other agent. Further, because of 
these reduced task demands, this method allowed testing these questions in 3-year-old children.  
The first of three studies presented in Chapter 3 aimed to test the assumption that, when 
distributing one higher-valued resource and one lower-valued resource distribute between a 
prosocial and a non-prosocial agent, children would systematically distribute the higher-valued 
resource to the prosocial agent. Previous research demonstrated that children use quantity (i.e., 
number and size) to distribute resources of higher value (i.e., more instances or a larger instance) 
to a prosocial agent (e.g., Kenward & Dahl, 2011; Baumard, Mascaro, & Chevallier, 2012). 
However, one goal of the present research was to assess whether children would distribute two 
resources that differed on some dimension other than and unrelated to quantity. This research 
thus adopted the same assumption as Blake and Rand (2010) – that children’s preferences reflect 
the underlying value they assign to resources. Prior to partaking in the resource distribution 
tasks, 3-year-old children selected their favorite (ostensibly higher-value) and least-favorite 
(ostensibly lower-value) sticker from an array of stickers. Children were then given those two 




agent who behaved prosocially (i.e., gave them a gift, cleaned up blocks) and one to an agent 
who was not prosocial (i.e., did not give them a gift, did not clean up blocks). Children reliably 
distributed their favorite sticker to the prosocial agent, suggesting that 3-year-old children assign 
relative and stable value to options, and they are able to use the value of a resource to 
systematically reward prosocial and/or punish non-prosocial agents. This study is the first, to my 
knowledge, to demonstrate that children as young as 3 years of age assign relative value to 
resources that is not predicated on quantity. Further, this study also introduces two new value 
discrimination tasks that could potentially be used to assess whether children’s resource 
valuation changes as a function of an experimental manipulation.  
The second study presented in Chapter 3 aimed to test whether observing other children’s 
resource preferences would influence 3-year-old children’s valuations of those resources. As in 
the DG study from Chapter 2, children viewed four peers sequentially display the same 
preference for one of two stickers (liking one and disliking the other). Children were then given 
either the liked sticker and a neutral sticker (Positive Condition) or the disliked sticker and 
neutral sticker (Negative Condition) to distribute in the same two tasks as the previous study. If 
children incorporated preference information into their object valuations, it was predicted that 
they would give the liked sticker (over the neutral sticker) to the prosocial agents in the Positive 
Condition, and would give the neutral sticker (over the disliked sticker) to the prosocial agents in 
the Negative Condition. In the Positive Condition, girls gave the liked sticker to the prosocial 
agents more often than would be expected by chance. In the Negative Condition both girls and 
boys gave the disliked sticker to the prosocial agent significantly less often than would be 
expected by chance. These findings indicate that children incorporated information gleaned from 




boys avoided giving the disliked sticker to the prosocial agents, suggesting they devalued that 
sticker relative to the neutral sticker. Further girls, but not boys, appeared to increase their 
valuation of the liked sticker relative to the neutral sticker, as they reliably gave the liked sticker 
to the prosocial agents.  
The third study in Chapter 3 directly tested whether children thought a new child would 
prefer a sticker that was liked by peers over one that was disliked. This study also aimed test 
whether 3-year-old children’s own preferences were influenced by those of their peers. After 
viewing their peers preferences, children were presented with all three stickers – the sticker their 
peers had liked, the sticker they disliked, and a new, neutral sticker. When asked which sticker a 
new gender-matched child would like, children reliably chose the liked sticker over the disliked 
and neutral sticker. In contrast, when asked which sticker they liked best, children selected 
equally between the liked and neutral sticker and reliably avoided the disliked sticker. These 
findings provide additional evidence that children incorporated their peers’ dislikes into their 
valuations to a greater degree than their peers’ likes. Further, these findings also suggest that 
children differentially weighted the influence of their peers’ preferences in their valuations 
depending on the context in which the valuation occurred. When children were asked to 
determine the preference of a new child, they had limited information to use in their valuation. 
Thus, their peers’ preferences, as one salient piece of information, were heavily weighted in their 
valuation. In contrast, when children determined their own preference for one of the stickers, 
they had substantially more information (e.g., their own gender, personal shape or color 
preferences, past experiences with similar options, etc.) to factor into their preference  – and thus 
their peers’ preferences were weighted less heavily in their valuation. This might have served to 




avoided choosing the disliked sticker for themselves, indicating that the disliked information was 
weighted more heavily than the liked information.  
That children’s valuations are influenced by their peers is a notable and novel 
contribution to the burgeoning literature on children’s learning from others. In the present 
studies, it is also possible, in addition to acquiring information, that children also incorporated 
their peers’ preferences into their own preferences for social benefits (e.g., peer support, 
friendship, access to group resources, etc.). Attending to and learning from others’ preferences, 
thus, might be a strategic way in which children combine knowledge acquisition with 
strengthening social bonds. In acquiring value information via the observation of peers’ 
preferences, children can learn about generally agreed upon, potentially culture-specific, values. 
Further, adopting the preferences of peers can potentially demonstrate similarity and belonging, 
indicate trustworthiness as a social partner, and serve as a bid to peers for social engagement.  
The recent findings that 4-year-old children will occasionally conform publically (out 
loud) after hearing a majority of peers offer an incorrect response, yet can privately (via 
pointing) indicate the correct response (Haun & Tomasello, 2011) suggests that young children 
can engage in acts ostensibly solely for social benefits. These findings are consequential because 
they demonstrate that children, like adults (e.g., Asch, 1956), will, at least in certain 
circumstances, prioritize conforming to a majority over providing factually correct information, 
and not incorporate information from the majority into their own knowledge. However, 
circumstances in which those demands conflict are arguably rare. People generally behave in 
appropriate, adaptive ways, and thus, garnering information from others preferences might be an 
adaptive strategy. The present studies point to at least one circumstance in which children might 




If children gain social benefits from adopting the preferences of their peers, an important 
question raised by the present findings is whether children’s option valuations would also be 
influenced by adults’ preferences, or if they are specifically sensitive to the preferences of their 
peers. One important, and compelling, reason for assessing the influence of peers’ preferences 
was to determine whether children considered their peers a good source of information from 
which to learn the value of resources. A second reason was to determine whether children would 
utilize information that was presented from a non-authoritative source. Thus, if children do 
acquire value information from adults’ preferences it might not be for the same reasons as when 
they acquire that value information from children. Further, it is also plausible that, like learning 
objective information (e.g., VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009; Rakoczy, Hamann, Warneken, & 
Tomasello, 2010), children consider the content or domain of the information when deciding 
from whom to learn. For example, children acquire information about the value of stickers from 
peers, and this might extend to other child-focused content such as toys and games. In contrast, 
children might turn to adults to acquire information about the value of adult-focused content. 
 Children might also consider the social context, and make a more nuanced assessment 
between peers and adults. For example, children might differentially adopt the preferences of 
new peers as a bid for friendship, especially in situations in which they are likely to encounter 
that peer again. In contrast, children might not adopt the preferences of a new adult as readily, 
because they are not angling for social benefits, and instead use familiarity or cues to expertise in 
considering whether to learn from adults’ preferences. Further, in the present studies children did 
not (could not) have a preference for one of the options prior to viewing their peers’ preferences. 
Thus, this research demonstrates that peers’ preferences influenced children’s acquisition of 




capability of changing established preferences. However, if others’ preferences can change 
established preferences, it might also be the case that the aforementioned motivations (i.e., 
contexts in which to learn from a peer or an adult) would also factor into whether children’s 
preexisting preferences changed as a result of observing others’ preferences.  
One final question of importance pertains to whether preference acquisition via others’ 
preferences extends beyond the object domain, to social preferences (e.g., who to interact with or 
befriend) or ideological values (e.g., what moral, political, and cultural, beliefs to hold). The 
present studies cannot directly speak to this question; however, there is no a priori reason to 
believe that learning from other’s preferences is limited to objects. Further, for any meaningful 
transfer of cultural information (i.e., beyond the initial social benefits and ease of making a quick 
decision) these influences need to persist over time. Future studies are needed to further clarify 
from whom children will acquire preference information, the types of information that can be 
acquired via preferences, and the extent to which that information persists over time.  
Social and cognitive processes are inextricably linked; social development relies on 
cognitive capacities, and cognition develops steeped in the social world. The social world is a 
rich source of information, and young children are able to use others actions and behavior – 
including their subjective preferences – to learn about the world. Together, the studies presented 
in this dissertation provide evidence that young children’s option valuations, and subsequent 
preferences, are influenced by the preferences of their peers. Corroborative findings from an 
established resource distribution task (Chapter 2), and two new tasks developed to assess value 
discrimination in young children (Chapter 3) demonstrate that children extract informational 
content about the value of options from observing their peers preferences, and use that value to 




appears to play a privileged role in influencing children’s choice behavior. Taken together, the 
present studies provide new insight into children’s early economic reasoning, and highlight the 
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